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India

The geopolitics of the Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean is an immense maritime space of great geopolitical and geoeconomic importance. It is a crossroad for sea trade that connects the advanced economies of the East and the West. At the same time, there are also many factors that threaten its stability. These are often closely related with the international dynamics of the Asia-Pacific, to the point that the two areas can be considered as single reality.

West: Challenges and Opportunities for Africa

On its western part, the Indian Ocean touches the shores of the vast African continent. This creates a peculiar mix of opportunities and challenges for coastal states like South Africa, Mozambique, Madagascar, Tanzania and Kenya. Thanks to their position, they can easily reach important economic areas such as India, the Middle East, Europe and the Asia-Pacific. Engaging in maritime trade with these regions could provide a major economic boost to these African states and improve the living conditions of their citizens. In addition, emerging powers like China and India are heavily spending in Africa to access its much-needed natural resources and exploit the opportunities for high investment returns. Yet, in the case of China, this also raises concerns. While African states welcome Chinese investments as they come with no legal precondition on the respect of civil and human rights, some worry that its economic penetration might result in political leverage and in a form of economic neo-colonialism.

There are also two states whose situation is particular. The first is Ethiopia, the powerhouse of the Horn of Africa. As other states along the continent’s eastern coast, it can greatly benefit from international sea trade, but unfortunately it is a landlocked country. This largely explains the recent deal it reached with Eritrea to settle their longstanding conflict: turning Eritrea into a friend would enable Ethiopia to access the sea and engage in maritime trade along one of the busiest routes in the world. As a matter of fact, the Red Sea is an obliged passage for ships sailing between Europe and Asia. Ethiopia has even expressed its intention to build a navy, which is a clear sign of its seafaring ambitions.

The second peculiar case is Somalia. In theory, it is also poised to take advantage from its position on the Indian Ocean, but in practice it is a failed state ruled by armed groups where the central government has not enough power to pursue such kind of maritime policy.

This raises the issue of the threats to sea trade along the Western shores of the Indian Ocean. Somalia is part of the problem, as it has become a hub for piracy. The difficult economic conditions have pushed many Somalis to start attacking cargos navigating along the country’s coasts. This became a serious problem that prompted the international community to organize a military operation to patrol the Somali waters and combat piracy. These efforts succeeded in securing the area and in reducing the number of attacks, but as long as the socio-economic conditions of coastal population do not improve, the risk of piracy will remain.

Then, there are two important chokepoints that connect the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean via the Red Sea, which can be considered as a peripheral area of the Indian Ocean putting it in communication with Europe: first, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait; second, the Suez Canal. Both passages are essential for sea trade, and any interruption would have a major impact on the global economy.

North: India & Hormuz

Located to the North, India is certainly the main regional player. A large and fast-growing economy, it is one of today’s most important rising powers and its influence is growing worldwide. New Delhi considers the Indian Ocean as “its own” maritime space, a vector for power projection and economic growth but also an area to be preserve from the intromissions of hostile powers for the sake of national security. India can enormously benefit from its position protracting towards the ocean midway along the vital East-West sea lanes, and in fact it already taking advantage from it. At the same time, by building a powerful navy it can extend its power abroad and protect its interests. As a matter of fact, New Delhi is concerned over the presence of foreign actors in the Indian Ocean, most notably Beijing. The PRC is indeed investing heavily in the region on the basis of its Maritime Silk Road plan, aimed at creating a string of ports to sustain trade with Europe. This is of central importance for China’s economy, which relies on sea trade for exporting goods and importing hydrocarbons; but some consider that the real objective of the project is to extend its influence in the region by economic means. In a context of broader Sino-Indian rivalry, New Delhi worries about Beijing’s presence in countries like the Maldives or Sri Lanka, considering it as a potential threat to its security. Similarly, India also sees unfavorably the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor that will connect the PRC with the ocean via the port of Gwadar.

Again, there is also a strategic chokepoint to consider: the Hormuz Strait, which connects the Persian Gulf with the Indian Ocean. This passage is vital for tankers carrying Middle Eastern oil to Europe and Asia and any interruption would have catastrophic economic consequences. Unfortunately, this is not a remote event: in case of a serious standoff between the US and Iran, the Strait would soon become a major flashpoint, since Teheran’s deterrence strategy is largely based on blocking the Strait; which it can do with relative ease due to geographic reasons.

East: the Indo-Pacific

To the East, the Indonesian archipelago and Australia separate the Indian Ocean from the Pacific. Similarly to Somalia, the waters around Indonesia had become infested with pirates in the recent past; and the phenomenon has been reduced only thanks to multilateral military and development efforts. Yet, if the living conditions of coastal populations deteriorated again, the problem may arise once more.

That said, Indonesia and Australia benefit from their position between the two oceans. It allows them to project their power in both directions, to reach the large European and East Asian markets and finally to access Africa with its resources and its potential for investments. Indonesia is particularly relevant in this regard: it is another emerging economy with a great potential, and its virtually controls all the major straits connecting the two oceans: Sunda, Lombok and most importantly Malacca. Indonesia’s growth is largely due to its position on these sea lanes, and Singapore has based its incredible wealth on it. Again, these passages are essential for maritime trade between Europe and Asia as well as for the latter’s energy security; and would become hotspots in case of war, notably between the US and China. If the US Navy closed them, it could seriously harm the tenure of the PRC’s economy. At the same time, they are also essential for American allies like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan; meaning that the US will use its naval power to ensure no hostile power blocks the Straits.

The eastern part of the Indian Ocean plays a fundamental role for maritime security; and the importance of the juncture between the two Oceans is leading many scholars, analysts and policy-makers to consider them as a single maritime region: the Indo-Pacific. The Indian Ocean is extremely important for states in East Asia because it represents the necessary passage to reach Europe; and the security dynamics of the Indian Ocean and of the Asia-Pacific are closely related. China’s New Silk Road initiative, the forays of its Navy in the waters of the Indian Ocean, the Sino-Indian competition, the free flow of oil from the Gulf and piracy in Indonesia are all strategic issues that tie the two oceanic regions. This explains why the concept of Indo-Pacific is also taking importance in American strategic discourse: the economic and security dynamics of the two areas are so intertwined that they must be considered as a single space. Other powers are applying the same logic, and this is having practical consequences: the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue uniting the US, Japan, India and Australia indicates their willingness to strengthen their political and military cooperation to face shared security challenges like the rise of China; and it represents the emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a political and strategic reality.

Conclusion: an Indo-Pacific future?

Many scholars believe that “the future is Asian”, which is even the title of a recent book by Parag Khanna. But Asia’s rise largely depends on trade with Europe and on oil imports from the Middle East across the Indian Ocean. As such, Asian states have major strategic concerns in this area. China, Japan and South Korea need to keep the sea lanes open. India is an emerging power whose influence is growing across the world via the sea. Indonesia is the pivot connecting the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. The United States, the world’s primary security provider, is facing many challenges in both Oceans and is committed to preserving the freedom of navigation. Moreover, the interests of the various stakeholders in the area are sometimes colliding, such as in the case of China and India. As such, with Asia’s importance growing every year in both economic and political terms, the Indo-Pacific is also gaining primary strategic relevance.

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Israel’s Enigmatic relationship with India

India and Israel have been allies for much of recent history although the relations between these two countries have been low-profile and only started getting global attention in recent years. Besides having strong economic ties the two countries also share key strategic and military cooperation.

Surprisingly India-Israel relations were largely informal until 1991. Despite having some ties since the 1960s mainly owing to defence and intelligence cooperation, India did not formalise diplomatic relations due to having a pro-Arab and pro-Palestinian stance. However this gradually changed when they formally established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992.[1]

History

India recognised Israel as early as 1950, but did not establish diplomatic ties until 1992. During the Suez crisis in 1956 the then Israeli foreign minister Moshe Sharett visited India as the Israeli army pushed into Egypt after Egyptian President Gamam Abdel Nasser nationalised the canal; while India played the role of mediator alongside the UK, the US and Yugoslavia.

During the Sino-Indian war in 1962, Indian PM Jawaharlal Nehru sought arms from Israel, writing to Israeli PM Ben Gurion, and he responded, forming the foundations for defense cooperation between the two countries. This paved way for increased bilateral cooperation over the years as India sought more arms in their war with Pakistan in 1965 as well as in 1971.[2]

Throughout much of the 1970 and 1980s, India kept its distance from Israel publicly due to its support for the Palestinian cause. India was a founding member of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) that was supportive of anti-colonial struggles around the world which explains their support for the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO).[3] India was astonishingly one of the first non-Arab states to recognise Palestinian independence. There were several geopolitical issues that shaped India’s standpoint during the 1970s and 80s. The seemingly antagonist position between India and Israel also involved India’s diplomatic strategy of trying to counter Pakistan’s influence in the Arab world as well as of safeguarding its oil supplies from the Gulf.

There were other major motives behind India’s anti-Israel stance. India has a large Muslim population and their antagonism towards Israel played a major role in delaying diplomatic relations, as politicians feared that they may lose Muslim votes in key regions if they were to formalise ties.[4] Also,  was the fact that thousands of Indian citizens worked in the Gulf, helping keep its foreign exchange reserves afloat.

Security cooperation

Even before establishing formal ties, India and Israel managed to collaborate in specific areas, with India’s main intelligence agency RAW (research and analysis wing) and Israel’s Mossad having signed a secret cooperation agreement in the areas of security, intelligence and military equipment.[5] The two top intelligence agencies established relationships since the 1960s. This was remarkable because throughout the 1970s and 80s their bilateral relations were sour. The situation started to shift in 1989 as three major developments sowed the seeds of change: first, the beginning of the era of coalition politics in India; second, the beginning of Pakistan-sponsored insurgency in Kashmir; and finally, break-up of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War coupled with the fall-out from the reversal of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.[6] Since the early 1990s, the growing insurgent activities in Kashmir sponsored by Pakistan heightened regional security environment of India and the then opposition party BJP kept pressurising the government to normalise relations with Israel. After the end of the Cold War, India, like many other countries had to make major changes to their foreign policy to accommodate the changing international milieu. It went towards economic liberalisation, opening its doors to other nations and subsequently formalised diplomatic relations with Israel. It was however kept low-profile due to India’s interests in the Middle East.

India gave a number of reasons to justify the 1992 opening of formal relations, which are as follows[7]:

  1. Israel’s criticality to what happens in West Asia and the Gulf, that is a part of India’s extended neighbourhood impacting its strategic space, energy supplies and the 6 million Indians living in the region.
  2. Sophisticated defence equipment , technology and systems from Israel; potential cooperation in security and defence including counter terrorism.
  3. Absence of any quid pro quo from the Arab states
  4. Agricultural prowess including related technologies of Israel.

More recently the economic rivalry between India and China plays a role in this context. The growing relations between China and Pakistan have raised insecurities, especially the fact that Pakistan are the largest recipient of Chinese arms. These issues gave India more reasons to build-up their own arms and as Israel are among the top arms manufacturers in the world with one of the best research and development facilities as well as a supposedly good counter-terrorism unit, there are more reasons to increase cooperation in the field of security and defence.

First Israeli PM visit to India[8]

Ariel Sharon was the first Israeli PM to visit India in 2003 and the bilateral relations between the two nations started gaining publicity. State visits from officials started to take place since the establishment of diplomatic relations. This laid the framework for further cooperation in various areas; Agreements on Cooperation in the field of Health Sciences and Medicine and on Cooperation in combating illicit trafficking and abuse of narcotic drugs and psychotic substances were signed in 2003. In the same year, more significant agreements were signed in the field of protection of the environment, and another on the exemption of Visa requirements of holders of diplomatic, official and service passports.

2005 saw a MoU on India-Israeli Research and Development Fund Initiative while in 2006 a major pact was signed in the field of agriculture cooperation.

 Bilateral trade

Bilateral trade progressed rapidly since 1992. From a base of USD 200 million in 1992 comprising primarily of diamonds, merchandise trade has diversified and the overall figure stood at an astonishing USD 5.19 billion in 2011. In 2016 the figure slumped to USD 4.16 billion in 2016 (excluding defence) with the balance of trade in Israel’s favour. Trade in diamonds constitutes over 53 percent of bilateral trade. After China and Hong Kong, India is Israel’s thirds largest trading partner in Asia. Currently the sectors forming the diversified bilateral trade include pharmaceuticals, agriculture, IT and telecom, and homeland security. India’s major exports to Israel include precious stones and metals, chemical products, textiles and textile articles, while major exports from Israel include precious stones and metals, chemicals and mineral products, base metals and machinery and transport equipment.

Cooperation between the two nations increased dramatically ever since the election of India’s new Hindu nationalist BJP government led by Narendra Modi in 2014. This was followed by a first ever visit by an Israeli defence minister in 2015. The current prime ministers Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and Modi of India met for the first time at a UN General Assembly in 2014 where they discussed economic, technological, and agricultural collaboration for the future, while Netanyahu expressed his concerns about a nuclear Iran and the spread of radical Islam throughout Middle East.[9] In 2017, Modi made a stand alone visit to Israel- the first ever by an Indian PM.

Just weeks before modi’s historic visit, Netanyahu’s cabined agreed on measures aimed at increasing Israel’s non-diamond exports to India by 25 percent while establishing a new 40 million USD joint innovation, research and development fund. In July this year Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) signed an agreement with India’s KSU in July 2018, to operate Israeli Taxibot semi-robotic vehicles at India’s New Delhi and Mumbai airports. Taxibot is connected to planes which taxi the airplanes from the airport’s jet bridge without the use of the airplane’s main engines.[10]

Israel in recent years have taken a strategic decision aimed at strengthening economic relations with China, Japan and India. Major Indian software companies including TCS, Infosys, Tech Mahindra and Wipro have began to penetrate the Israeli market. During PM Modi’s visit in July 2017, the first meeting of the newly established India-Israel CEOs Forum took place.[11]

Defence cooperation: military equipment and technology

Defence cooperation forms one of the strongest aspects of the bilateral relations

India is the largest buyer of Israeli military equipment, while Israel is India’s largest customer after Russia.[12]

Israel produces some of the most sophisticated, cutting edge weapons systems in the world and India have been major buyers for a while now. India buys weapons systems for their armed forces, including navy and air force.

Since the 1990s, India purchased UAVs, drones, airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) radar systems, anti-tank missiles and many more weapons systems in deals worth billions of dollars. In 2007, the two nations signed a 2.5 billion DSD deal to develop an anti-aircraft weapons systems in India, and in 2009[13], Israel sold Barak 8 air defence systems to India for a staggering 1.1 billion USD. In 2011 Indian army bought more than 1000 units of Israeli X-95 assault rifle to use in counterinsurgency operation. In 2011 there were reports of a deal in which India were to purchase a large number of Israeli Spike anti-tank missiles, launchers, and related equipment worth nearly a billion dollars, from Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense Systems;[14]. Although the old contract with Rafael was cancelled, India has recently been on the verge of signing a 500 million USD deal with Israel to buy 4500 Spike missiles in a government-to-government purchase which could be finalised any moment.[15]

Israel also provides India with military technologies, and strategies for count-terrorism, including offering assistance following the 2008 Mumbai attacks.[16]

 Shifting Israel-Palestine stance

In 2015, India abstained from voting against Israel at the UN human rights commission signalling a shift in its Israel-Palestine policy. However in 2017 it voted for an Arab-sponsored resolution that rejected the US recognition of Jerusalem as capital of Israel.

 Conclusion

Despite a recent setback taking place due to India having voted against the US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the bilateral relations between the two nations have been growing stronger since the arrival of Modi making way for a new era of collaboration. In early 2018, Saudi Arabia opened its airspace for the first time ever to a commercial flight to Israel with the inauguration of an Air India route between New Delhi and Jerusalem.[17]

It seems today that the history of advocacy for the Palestinian cause is gradually diminishing as India is growing in alliance with Israel in more areas of cooperation and assistance. While India racks up more arms deals and equips its military with more sophisticated weapons systems and technology, it will be interesting to see further developments especially in the field of defence and security cooperation and find out what their main objectives are.

 [1] http://www.atimes.com/india-israel-relations-obscurity-certainty/

[2] https://www.livemint.com/Politics/k4CBHr4bIzoZ0O6OBOXw1M/India-Israel-ties-A-timeline.html ; https://www.tau.ac.il/humanities/abraham/india-israel.pdf

[3] http://www.rubincenter.org/meria/2004/12/pant.pdf

[4] Aafreedi, Navras (2012). “The Impact of Domestic Politics on India’s Attitudes towards Israel and Jews”. In Singh, Priya; Susmita, Bhattacharya. Perspectives on West Asia: The Evolving Geopolitical Discourses. Shipra Publications. pp. 171–183. ISBN 9788175416376.

[5] Pant, Harsh V. 2004a. ‘India–Israel Partnership: Convergence and Constraints’, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), vol. 8, no. 4

[6] https://www.tau.ac.il/humanities/abraham/india-israel.pdf

[7] https://www.tau.ac.il/humanities/abraham/india-israel.pdf

[8] https://www.tau.ac.il/humanities/abraham/india-israel.pdf

[9] https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/history-and-overview-of-india-israel-relations

[10] https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/history-and-overview-of-india-israel-relations

[11] https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Unclassified_Bilateral_briefb.pdf

[12] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-airshow-india-israel/israeli-defense-minister-lands-at-india-airshow-to-boost-arms-sales-idUSKBN0LM0WL20150218

[13] “IAI signs $2.5 billion deal with India – Israel Business, Ynetnews”. Ynetnews.com.

[14] https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-1000633160 ; https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/world/india-to-buy-israelis-spike-missile-for-1-b/article9749112.ece

[15] https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-set-to-seal-500mn-deal-with-israel-to-buy-4-500-spike-missiles/story-wdT2IufrQ4ldybZFX76X5K.html

[16] Horovitz, David; Matthew Wagner (27 November 2008). “10 hostages reportedly freed from Mumbai Chabad House”. The Jerusalem Post.

[17] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-israel-airspace-riyadh-tel-aviv-flight-air-india-iran-flight-times-airlines-a8269891.html

The Mughal Empire – Rise of Muslims Episode 5

Babur was twelve years old when he became king. He was descended from Tamerlane on his father’s side and from Genghis Khan on his mother’s. Immediately he had to fight for survival. Babur dreamt of glory; he would take Samarkand, the seat of his great ancestor Timur.

In 1497 at the age of fifteen Babur marched on Samarkand and seized the city. But then he was ousted, to discover that meanwhile he had lost his own beloved home at Fergana. His whole world had collapsed; he was now no king at all.

He had lost Samarkand and was driven into exile, admitting, ‘I was reduced to a sore state and wept much.’ Harassed by rebellion, opposed by his army, without a home and reduced to a low point in his fortunes, he would fight back, ‘One or two reverses could not make me sit down and do nothing.’

The Geopolitics of the Bay of Bengal

The Bay of Bengal is located in the North-East region of the Indian Ocean, and is bounded by Bangladesh to the North, Myanmar and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands of India to the East, India and Sri Lanka to the West. Some of the major sea ports in the Bay of Bengal include Chennai, Kolkata and Visakhapatnam in India and the port of Chittagong in Bangladesh making the region (of the Bay) a crucial economic hub. With an area of 2,173,000 square kilometres, the Bay of Bengal is the largest Bay in the world which is at the forefront of Asia’s experience of climate change[1]. Over the years the significance Bay of Bengal have been on the rise largely owing to the rapid economic growth of the littoral nations and the major powers involved in the bay.[2]

Brief History

Throughout the medieval, early modern and modern periods of world history from the indigenous city-states as well as empires, later to the British Empire the Bay of Bengal had been a singular civilisation united by a rice culture and common coastline that kept bringing trade and migrants along its shores.[3] Historically the Bay of Bengal has played a significant role of a connector- where trade, commerce and culture were intertwined for centuries. However in the early 20th century the British Empire used the Bay of Bengal for trade and other related activities, causing a significant increase in shipping between British India and British Burma. Yangon (Burmese Capital) was fascinatingly turned into one of the busiest ports in the world for migrant arrivals alongside the likes of New York; with majority of the flow from India towards Burma (now known as Myanmar)[4]. Strong ties between Burma and India developed as a direct consequence of the migration, which followed a downward curve in the years following the partition of India in 1947 and the Burmese independence in 1948 from Japanese occupation since world war II.[5]

Economic and Security issues

Bay of Bengal is rapidly becoming an area of key economic and strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. A crucial geopolitical development was the creation of a regional body- the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) between Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand- which seeks to promote regional cooperation and engagement in the area particularly between the two major geopolitical blocs of the region- the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). However BIMSTEC’s focus is solely economic with their main objective being supporting free trade hence it does little to provide any support in terms of maritime security issues that have particularly grown in recent years with respect to Chinese and Indian interests.[6]

Crucial geopolitical factors concerning the Bay of Bengal

China’s economic and security interests over the past few decades have resulted in greater Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. China has been successful in developing strong economic relations with major Bay of Bengal countries such as Bangladesh and Myanmar primarily through infrastructure development projects that include pipelines, roads and railway, port-development and power-plant construction.[7] Key strategists from India expressed concerns over the rising Chinese influence in the outposts of the Indian Ocean which they fear could enable China to turn them into military bases encircling India.[8] Although it is argued that China’s interests are more economic in terms of ease of connecting to the other parts of the world on their West, it has not stopped India from taking precautionary steps by making rapid developments in modernising their naval capabilities as well as developing multilateral and bilateral naval ties with key players of the Bay of Bengal.

China-India relations in the Bay of Bengal

China and India are playing a strategic and economic tug-of-war in Myanmar among other littoral nations along the Bay of Bengal. China has recently assisted in building key ports in Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka and according to recent reports it is funding the development of the Chittagong port of Bangladesh, while having reached an multi-billion dollar agreement to build a major deep sea port in Kyaukpyu, Myanmar on the coast of the Bay of Bengal.[9] China already have a significant presence in Myanmar with the gas pipeline connecting China’s Yunnan Province with Myanmar’s major Rakhine state already in operation and a parallel oil pipeline that is supposed to soon begin operations.[10] Since the launch of India’s Look East Policy in the 1990s it has strengthened its political, economic and strategic ties with South East Asian countries and beyond [11], with more actions being considered in order to have leverage over China. It is safe to say that while India had other priorities such as the inward economic orientation and preoccupation with troubled land borders mainly in the North and the North West, it was the growing influence of China’s maritime influence that prompted India’s strategic interests in the Bay of Bengal through its Look East Policy.[12] India and China are locked into this strategic competition for naval dominance as well as influence in the Indian Ocean’s littoral states and it can be argued that China might just have the edge due to its closer connections to some of the major littorals- i.e. Bangladesh and Myanmar.

The island nation of Sri Lanka also has strong economic ties with both India and China, with a growing regional and security cooperation with the former. However the recent takeover of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port by China has had significant impacts- one of which is lessening the country’s debts to China, who has made a lot of investments in Sri Lanka over the years.[13]

Maritime disputes


Bangladesh, India and Myanmar have had their fair share of disputes regarding maritime territories. One of the most recent disputes was between Bangladesh and Myanmar as tensions were building when South Korea’s Daewoo began natural gas exploration for Myanmar in what Bangladesh claimed was their waters, prompting Bangladesh to submit a continental shelf claim to the United Nations’ Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Largely owing to Myanmar’s conflicting claims, the events led up to the mobilisation of naval forces along the disputed area although eventually a conflict was avoided.[14] The disputes were largely settled by the International Tribunal for the Land of the Seas (ITLOS) in 2012 and 2014 respectively.[15]

Myanmar relations with the littoral nations

Myanmar is regarded as a key player in the strategic equation along the Northern region of the Bay of Bengal that is fiercely contested by China and India. Myanmar have seen growing economic ties with India since the World War II while China have also been developing ties through various means primarily comprising infrastructure support.  Myanmar signed its first bilateral trade deal with India in 1970 and has been gradually increasing in volume since. According to some of the latest figures available, Indian exports to Myanmar totalled US$1.1 billion (1111.19 million) in the FY 2016-17 while imports were worth US$ 1 billion (1067.25 million), making it the fifth largest trade partner with Myanmar, despite trade said to remain below potential.[16] On the other hand Bangladesh and Myanmar established diplomatic ties in 1972 which resulted in progressing bilateral relations in the subsequent years. However in the mid-seventies as President Thein Sein’s government transformed Myanmar’s military government into a quasi-civilian government the bilateral relations never realised their full potential.[17] The end of their military rule in 2011 brought about a new glimmer of hope, however the recent Rohingya crisis has hindered any progress as Bangladesh are hosting a million refugees and have constantly failed in their repatriation due to the Bangladeshi government failing to have reached an agreement with the Myanmar government led by Aung (San) Suu Kyi.

Security/strategic issues

China are the largest trade partners to both Bangladesh and Myanmar and is also the biggest supplier of conventional arms to both the countries. Bangladesh had recently purchased two submarines from China to bolster its naval forces causing tensions in India, with Indian analysts claiming it “greatly enhances the mistrust between Delhi and Dhaka”.[18]

While most of the issues were regarding the littoral nations and China, major actors such as Japan, alongside China have significant interest in the Bay of Bengal, as they access it through the Malacca Strait for the purpose of trade in goods and energy.[19] One of the most significant reasons for China’s growing presence is to find reliable oil supplies and secure unencumbered SLOCs.

India on the other hand had been working towards a “Bay of Bengal community” envisaging greater security cooperation with the littoral nations.[20] It is obvious that other actors play a significant role however the Bay of Bengal does have significance for India’s own best interests as well as data from 2013 reveals that 95 percent of India’s foreign trade by volume and 75 percent by value were conducted by sea.[21] The economic growth also led to India’s expansion of its Navy as it claims is for the safety of the Ocean’s SLOCs regarding it a critical move to support and protect for themselves and for the global community.[22]

Other challenges to stability

There is little doubt about the significance of the Bay of Bengal to the Asia’s rising powers however there are some challenges especially for its low-lying littorals. Currently, the Bay is being reshaped by population growth, climate change, overexploitation of fisheries, degradation of critical habitats, pollution, and deteriorating water quality and it is getting increasingly clear that multilateral cooperation is vital for the littorals, especially important is that they keep aside their political differences to work together while maintaining a healthy competition. Currently there is already an initiative known as the Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem (BOBLME) Project designed to improve the lives of the coastal populations through improved regional management of the Bay of Bengal environment and its fisheries, and countries that are involved are as follows- Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand.[23]

What’s Next

The geopolitics surrounding the Bay of Bengal is probably one of the most complex issues in the continent if not the world, with the region comprising a diverse range of social, economic and political factors. However there is little doubt that the key actors involved with the Bay of Bengal all have a crucial role to play in the progress of the region and for themselves in relation to prospects of regional strategic security and economic cooperation and transformation of the (developing) nations.

 

[1] http://blogs.bbk.ac.uk/research/2014/01/27/the-bay-of-bengal-in-global-history/

[2] https://hrcak.srce.hr/135023

[3] https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/critical-bay-bengal

[4] King’s College Discussion. “The Bay of Bengal: Rise and Decline of a South Asian Region”. YouTube.

[5] https://www.mea.gov.in/images/pdf/Indian-Migrants-Myanmar.pdf ; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33973982

[6] https://southasianvoices.org/bay-of-bengal-indias-centerpiece-springboard/

[7] https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IRP-2012-U-002319-Final.pdf

[8] https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IRP-2012-U-002319-Final.pdf

[9] https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/china-myanmar-ink-deal-for-port-on-bay-of-bengal-third-in-india-s-vicinity/story-Lbm4IwOMuqrNvXGv4ewuYJ.html ; https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/china-to-build-port-in-myanmar-third-in-indias-neighbourhood-1944916

[10]

[11] http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/indien/11043.pdf

[12] https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/chinese-takeaway-bengals-bay/

[13] https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/navy-league/2018/04/09/sri-lanka-cedes-major-port-to-china-fueling-tensions/

[14] https://amti.csis.org/the-bangladeshmyanmar-maritime-dispute-lessons-for-peaceful-resolution/

[15] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RskGT2pUiIY

[16] https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/MYANMAR_August_2017_new.pdf

[17] https://www.myanmarisis.org/publication_pdf/final-version-myanmar-bangladesh-relations-mmedits-ah2-1wpFhW.pdf

[18] https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/why-chinas-submarine-deal-with-bangladesh-matters/

[19] https://hrcak.srce.hr/135023

[20] https://www.deccanherald.com/national/india-wants-bay-bengal-be-688774.html

[21] Hughes, L., 2014. Examining the Sino-Indian Maritime Competition: Part 4 – India’s Maritime Strategy. Future Directions International. [online] January 30 2014. Available at: http://www.futuredirections.org. au/publications/indian-ocean/1516-examining-the-sino-indian- maritime-competition-part-4-india-s-maritime-strategy.html

[22] https://hrcak.srce.hr/135023

[23] https://hrcak.srce.hr/135023

Bangladesh-India relations: towards a stronger alliance?

Bangladesh and India have been allied more or less since their inception despite having minor disputes on certain issues. The current Bangladeshi ruling party have taken Indo-Bangladeshi relations to the next level since they came to power in 2009 (who are now serving their second term with elections in a couple of months), reaching major milestones in security cooperation as well a massive upsurge in bilateral trade.

History

Bangladesh is surrounded by India from the North, West and much of the East with the Bay of Bengal in the South and Myanmar in the South-East. The border between Bangladesh and India covers a staggering 4,095 kilometres with West Bengal having the largest share of 2217 kilometres[1].

Both countries have close cultural ties, most significant of which perhaps would be language- i.e. Bengali. The main official language of India’s West Bengal is Bengali, spoken by over a 100 million people, which also happens to be the only official language of Bangladesh. On the other hand, Hindi and Bengali have same roots in the Sanskrit language which causes them to have many similarities and enables ease of learning.

Bangladesh had been part of British India until 1947, after which it was annexed as part of Pakistan (Bangladesh was known as East Pakistan, the West Pakistan was the Pakistan of today). However, after a 9-month long war of liberation Bangladesh gained independence in 1971 and subsequently joined the Commonwealth of nations in 1972[2], and the United Nations in 1974.[3] India had been an independent state since the end of the British Empire, with a history of complex and largely hostile relations with Pakistan due to a number of historical and political events.

Bangladesh have had friendly relations with India throughout much of their history. India has provided significant assistance to Bangladesh in their War of Liberation against Pakistan in 1971 in terms of military support and firepower. However, it must be noted that ever since the British left in 1947, India have always had a volatile relationship with Pakistan and they acted in their own best interests as they felt threatened with the geographical presence of Pakistan from the East and the West. Consequently, India was the first country to recognise Bangladesh as an independent state immediately afterwards.

Bangladesh has a moderate foreign policy that places multilateral diplomacy as one of its core initiatives. Ambassador of Bangladesh to the U.S., Mohammad Ziauddin stated in 2009 that Bangladesh’s foreign policy is based on the Father of the Nation Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s dictum, “Friendship with all and malice towards none”, with the ruling party leader Sheikh Hasina and Prime Minister of Bangladesh being the daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.[4]

Trade

The first trade agreement between the two countries was signed in 1972 and trade volume is staggering as of today. According to the some of the most recent available figures, Indian exports to Bangladesh totalled $4.5 billion between July 2016-March 2017 while Bangladesh exports to India was worth $672.40 million during the Fiscal Year 2016-17. India have also extended three Lines of Credits (LOCs) between 2010-2017 worth up to US$ 8 billion, making Bangladesh the largest recipient of Indian LOC’s.[5]

Today, Bangladesh is home to the fastest growing megacity in the world- Dhaka; while the country also boasts one of the fastest growing economies in the world, with a GDP growth rate averaging over six percent annually over the past ten years or so.[6] On the other hand, India is the most populous democracy boasting the sixth largest economy in the world by nominal GDP.[7]

Major Disputes in Bangladesh-India Relations

Despite good relations there have been disputes over borders throughout history, and it was not until June 2015 that many of the long-lasting disputes were largely settled.[8] Other significant disputes include maritime claims over seawater at the Bay of Bengal.

Border Dispute: One of the most discussed topics in their recent bilateral relations had been the border killings of Bangladeshi citizens along the Indo-Bangladesh border by India’s Border Security Forces (BSF) with their apparent “shoot-to-kill” policy in which the Human Rights Watch claimed had killed nearly 1,000 people (Bangladeshi citizens) between 2001-2011.[9] Indian officials have argued that the reason for the attacks were largely due to increasing illegal migration of Bangladeshis into India as well as persistent misuse of borders by illicit traders.[10]

River Dispute: Another major dispute concerns the sharing of the River Teesta. Teesta is one of the 54 rivers shared by Bangladesh and India[11]. This river originates in Sikkim and flows through the North of West Bengal and meets Brahmaputra river in Bangladesh[12]. The countries reached agreement on sharing the river for the first time in 1983 according to which the share of water was (as follows): India- 39%, Bangladesh- 36%, Unallocated -25%. However in recent years Bangladeshi has been asking for an equitable share. Water disputes between the two countries have existed for quite a long time throughout history. Notably it took 20 years to end the Ganges river dispute in 1996. In 2011 an interim deal that was supposed to last the 15 following years increased the share of India to 42.5 per cent and that of Bangladesh to 37.5 per cent. But to the disappointment of Bangladesh as well as India, it never materialised, largely due to the government of West Bengal refusing to sign due to concerns of the northern region drying out[13]. Despite planning failure being regarded as one of the main reasons for not having reached an agreement as of yet, there are other underlying reasons why things haven’t materialised. There is no denying that Bangladesh do need their share of water, with the Asian Foundation reporting in 2013 that Teesta’s flood plain covers 14 per cent of the total cropped area of Bangladesh provides direct livelihood opportunities to approximately 73% of its population[14]. On the other hand, the River Teesta plays a major role in the Northern Bengal while nearly half a dozen districts in the entire West Bengal state are dependent on it.[15]

Government stance:

The previous Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government did not have strong alliance with India and thus were not quite receptive to India’s concerns. They had also garnered opposition from India due to providing refuge to  leaders and members of some of the North Eastern nonstate actors/militias. However due to their close relations, the current ruling party have largely followed India-friendly policies while taking India’s side on their fight against North Eastern separatists.[16] In spite of all these, Delhi closely anticipates an agreement for the sharing of River Teesta which they believe would give them political leverage over the apparent rising influence of China in the Bay of Bengal.[17]

Awami League/Ruling party relations with India

The current ruling party led by Sheikh Hasina has had a strong alliance with India ever since they came to power in 2009, with major acts of cooperation taking place in the subsequent years. Bilateral relations of the two countries had never been better as it has been over the past decade or so. Prior to 2017, there were no formal mechanisms in place for any significant security cooperation, but that changed in 2017. As Sheikh Hasina made a special visit to India in 2018 which resulted in the signing of a MoU on the framework for defence cooperation. That paved way for improved cooperation between the armed forces of both the countries, with MoU’s signed for cooperation ranging from joint military exercises, sharing of strategical operations studies for the Defence Services Command and Staff colleges, coast-guard cooperation between the two countries to an extension of line of credit worth US$500 million for the purchase of defence equipment from India.[18]

One of the major deals was the Rampal Power Plant which is a proposed 1320 Megawatt coal-fired power station in Khulna region, Bangladesh which is a joint-venture between the Bangladesh Power Development Board and India’s National Thermal Power Corporation.[19] However the signing of the deal was subject to much controversy due to the proposed site being only 14 kilometres North of the worlds largest mangrove forest, the Sundarbans which happens to be a UNESCO world heritage site.[20] It received attention in the local as well as the international arena because the project violates the environmental impact assessment guidelines for coal-based thermal power plants.[21] Environmental experts have expressed major concerns due to the close its proximity to the Sundarbans, while there have been campaigns by The National Committee on Protection of Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, and Power-Port, and environmentalists against the proposed project. Despite all the protests, the Bangladeshi government have consistently denied all claims and allegations about the negative environmental impacts of the Rampal project. The project has been under way for a while now however little progress have been made.[22]

Conclusion

In September 2018 Bangladesh signed a MoU with India which would let the latter use two of Bangladesh’s major ports– Chittagong and Mongla[23]. Bangladesh and India are two of the major economies of South Asia and their relationship will have a lasting impact on the region’s development. While India has the potential to emerge as a major world power competing with the likes of China and the U.S, Bangladesh may also have a role to play in their development. With the Bangladeshi general elections coming up, the Awami League are favourites to get re-elected, while it is the same for BJP, with PM Narendra Modi expected to remain PM should they win again, the relations between India and Bangladesh are likely to get better and better, with the only worry for India being China’s increasing cooperation with Bangladesh.

References

[1] https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/5-things-to-know-about-india-bangladesh-ties-from-trade-to-security/story-qgVND0mAQ4S1DpmYpzd5lJ.html

[2] “Bangladesh Joins Commonwealth”. Edmonton Journal. Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. 19 April 1972 – via Google News.

[3] “United Nations: Palestinian Position Becomes Critical Issue”. The Citizen. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. 18 September 1974 – via Google News.

[4] https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/south-asia-week-bangladeshs-policy-priorities-and-its-relationship-united-states-and

[5] https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Bangladesh_September_2017_en.pdf

[6] Trading Economics, 2018, Bangladesh GDP Growth Rate. <https://tradingeconomics.com/bangladesh/gdp-growth>

[7] “India becomes world’s sixth largest economy, muscles past France”. Archived from the original on 9 August 2018

[8] Serajul Quadir (6 June 2015). “India, Bangladesh sign historic land boundary agreement”. Reuters India.

[9] “India/Bangladesh: Indiscriminate Killings, Abuse by Border Officers”. Human Rights Watch. December 9, 2010; “India’s shoot-to-kill policy on the Bangladesh border”. The Guardian. 23 January 2011; “Khaleda Zia assures counter-terror co-operation to India”. Yahoo News. Indo Asian News Service. 2012-10-29

[10] “Khaleda Zia assures counter-terror co-operation to India”. Yahoo News. Indo Asian News Service. 2012-10-29

[11] https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/5-things-to-know-about-india-bangladesh-ties-from-trade-to-security/story-qgVND0mAQ4S1DpmYpzd5lJ.html

[12] https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/the-teesta-river-dispute-explained-in-10-points/articleshow/58091320.cms

[13] https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/teesta-has-one-sixteenth-of-water-needed-for-agriculture-117041500257_1.html

[14] https://www.clearias.com/teesta-river-dispute/

[15] https://www.clearias.com/teesta-river-dispute/

[16] https://www.clearias.com/teesta-river-dispute/

[17] https://www.clearias.com/one-belt-one-road-obor/

[18] https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-bangladesh-defence-cooperation-coming-of-age-at-last/#_edn2

[19] “Indo-Bangla joint company for power import”. The Independent. Dhaka. 8 March 2011.

[20] Rahman, Khalilur (24 February 2013). “Demand for Rampal power plant relocation”. Financial Express. Dhaka.

[21] Kumar, Chaitanya (24 September 2013). “Bangladesh Power Plant Struggle Calls for International Solidarity”. The Huffington Post.

[22] https://thewire.in/south-asia/rampal-power-project-sundarbans-india-bangladesh; https://www.dhakatribune.com/business/2018/01/21/little-progress-large-coal-fired-power-plant-projects

[23] “Transporting Goods to 7 Sisters: Dhaka to let Delhi use Ctg, Mongla ports”. The Daily Star. Dhaka, Bangladesh. 18 September 2018. < https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/news/carrying-goods-7-sisters-dhaka-let-delhi-use-ctg-mongla-ports-1635397>

Can India become a global power?

India is a country that is expected to play a central role in the 21st century. Having a large and fast-growing economy, it is also strengthening its military and is well positioned to dominate South Asia and extend its influence beyond it. But it must also face notable challenges, both domestically and geopolitically.

THE GEOGRAPHICAL BASES OF INDIA’S POWER

To understand India’s current international role and to anticipate the one it will have in the coming decades, it is necessary to analyse the geographic fundamentals of its power.

The first thing to consider is its dimension. India is a vast state and this has several positive and negative implications. On the one hand, this means that India can benefit from a notable strategic depth, but on the other it also means that connecting all the parts of its territory is a difficult endeavour.

This must be considered along with India’s configuration. Its territory presents a wide range of environments and climatic areas. Far to the north there are the towering mountains of Himalaya, a formidable geographic barrier that separates it from China. This is important, considering the complicated relations between the two powers.

Then, there are the fertile valleys of the Ganges and other rivers, which are vital sources of water and useful communication lanes that have favoured agriculture, industrialization and energy production.

The Deccan Plateau that occupies the southern part of the Peninsula is another notable geographic feature, also because of its mineral resources.

India holds quite abundant ore deposits that have helped its industrialization. In terms of energy, while it has its own production of oil and other fossil fuels, this is not sufficient to meet the country’s large and expanding needs.

Other areas include jungles, arid deserts and tropical shores; which all present both advantages and challenges: for instance, the Thar desert between India and Pakistan is a useful buffer zone, but is also a problem for economic development.

Finally, in terms of position India occupies most of South Asia, and its location favours both defence and power projection. As seen before, it benefits from good natural barriers to the north, but at the same time its neighbours are not friendly.

To the north-east, China is getting everyday more powerful and its geopolitical ambitions are a matter of concern for India.

To the north-west lays Pakistan, which apart from being India’s arch-nemesis since the 1947 partition has also built close ties with the PRC. But while the situation to the north is very challenging for India, its southern borders are very favourable.

There, the coast extends for thousands of kilometres on the open Ocean. This means three things: first, that there are no hostile powers at the border that threaten India’s security; even though it does not see positively China’s activities in that maritime area.

Second, this grants India an easy access to offshore resources and most importantly to sea trade. This is also favoured by the fact that India is located mid-way between East Asia and Europe, two of the world’s richest economic areas, plus to the Middle East and its energy resources. Third, this enables India to project its power with little effort, notably through its Navy.

Yet, there are also challenges deriving from India’s position, notably linked to climate change. Having a typical monsoon climate characterized by cycles of abundant rainfalls and dry periods, South Asia is extremely exposed to its effects, as demonstrated by the seriousness and frequency of recent phenomena like drought, floods, and violent storms. Moreover, this also favours the spread of pests and disease. All such factors bear enormous costs both in the form of direct damage and of prevention efforts, and is a notable obstacle to India’s development.

India’s economic and military power

The rise of India as a major power largely lays on its economic development. In 2017, its GDP rose by 6.7% and today it is the world’s fourth in terms of Purchasing Power Parity. Its economy is diversified and several Indian firms have become major players in global business. Financially, India is generally stable, even though it experienced some troubles in recent years.

But the country is not yet fully developed. Infrastructures remain insufficient, and inefficiency exist in various sectors. While unemployment is low (less than 9% in 2017), larger shares of the population continue to live below the poverty line, and traditional agriculture still absorbs a considerable portion of the workforce. Income inequality remains strong, with large differences in wealth distribution between upper and lower classes and between different regions.

In the demographic dimension, India has a population of around 1.28 billion people, making it the second largest in the world just behind China, and it is expected to surpass it in the coming years. Most Indians are young, which is positive for its economic development. But at the same time having a big population also brings several challenges: achieving food and energy security becomes more difficult, as well as providing public services such as a healthcare.  Moreover, this raises the problem of overcrowding and pollution, especially in large cities. Finally, the differences in wealth distribution can result in to social tensions: most of the population lives in the north, where a considerable Muslim minority is also present, but these areas are poorer than the southern parts of the country. In this regard, it should be noted that India has been fighting for decades against the insurgency of a Maoist group called the Naxalites.

Nevertheless, India continues its rise, also in military terms. It can field a large force that regularly participates to international exercises, and over the past few years it has been spending around 2.5% off its GDP in defence expenditures to modernize its armed forces. The Navy holds a particular importance, as it represents the mean to project its power across the Indian Ocean. As of today, the Indian Navy operates a large fleet that includes an aircraft carrier, a nuclear-powered attack submarine and several other units. In cooperation with Russia, India is also developing the BrahMos hypersonic cruise missile. Finally, it must not be forgotten that India is a nuclear power with an estimated stockpile of more than 100 warheads.

India’s geopolitics and foreign policy

For decades, India has maintained a nonaligned policy, of which it has been one of the leaders. But non-alignment does not mean neutrality.  As a matter of fact, India has pursued its own national interests and has been involved in several conflicts.

Its oldest rival is of course Pakistan. Immediately after the partition in 1947, the two fought a major war, followed by another two in 1965 and 1971, plus series of skirmishes. Today, the relations remain tense, but the conflict remains frozen because both states have developed a nuclear strike capacity.

The main point of the divergence is Kashmir, which remains divided between India, Pakistan and China (who controls the Aksai Chin since the 1962 war with India). Apart from having become a symbol of the Indo-Pakistani rivalry, Kashmir also has a strategic importance for these powers.

Ruling it allows to control the flow of water along the Indus valley, with all the consequences for human and economic development. For India, Kashmir is the gateway towards Central Asia as well as a region to control in order to prevent Pakistan from cooperating with its powerful Chinese ally.

On the other hand, for Pakistan dominating it is necessary to have more strategic depth and to preserve its connection with China, especially now that they are working together to develop the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), an ambitious infrastructure project to connect the two countries and that Islamabad considers fundamental to boost its economy, even though there are concerns over the debts its completion will bring.

This makes it clear that Pakistan is not India’s only strategic problem, and not even the main one. In recent years, China has become the prominent national security concern for India. One reason is the former’s close ties with Pakistan, but there also direct disputes between Beijing and New Delhi, namely over the aforementioned Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. The latter belongs to India, but is claimed by the PRC, and it represents a unique strategic challenge for New Delhi. As a matter of fact, it is connected to the rest of India only via a narrow passage chocked between China and Bangladesh and known as the “chicken neck”.  India fears that in case of a conflict the Chinese will rapidly overtake the Arunachal Pradesh by attacking this passage and cutting it from the rest of its territory.

In addition, Beijing and New Delhi are engaged in a geopolitical competition in South Asia. In 2017, the two powers faced each other in a military standoff over the Doklam Plateau, a strategic territory belonging to Bhutan (traditionally close to India) but claimed by the PRC; and since then they have been building up their military forces along the border.

China is also establishing ties with Nepal, raising concerns that the country me fall under its control, which would allow it to directly threaten Northern India. New Delhi has similar concerns over Bangladesh, because if it were to adopt a pro Chinese stance, the “chicken neck” would become even more vulnerable.

But the Sino-Indian rivalry is not limited to South Asia. The two are also competing in Indochina, where each of them is promoting its own economic and political projects. New Delhi is doing so on the basis of its “Look East Policy” launched in the 90s, whereas the latter considers this region an important element of its broader “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) strategy. In this regard, it is notable that India has refused to cooperate with China in this ambitious project.

Another country where their interest collide is Iran. India considers it a potentially precious ally, because it would allow to take Pakistan between two fires. Moreover, it is also a source of oil. But for these very same result and to counter the U.S., China is also interested in building a partnership with Iran.

Last but not least, there is the maritime dimension. Beijing is fostering its ties and establishing a greater presence in the Indian Ocean, in the optic of developing its Maritime Silk Road to connect its territory with Europe and the Middle East and by sea. But New Delhi considers this as “its own” Ocean and as an essential area for its plans to extend its influence on a global scale. Therefore, it is concerned by Beijing’s initiatives; notably in countries like Sri Lanka and the Maldives. In regard to the letter, the political turmoil that has affected the archipelago was largely to be interpreted in the optic of the Sino-Indian rivalry; and the recent electoral victory of Mohamed Solih seems to have marked a point in favour of India.

As a consequence of its rivalry with Beijing, New Delhi is also developing closer ties with other capitals that share similar security interests. The most notable trend is the gradual rapprochement with Washington. Even though it was never openly opposed to the US, during much of the Cold War India sympathized with the USSR and its relations with America were rather cold. But now that both are concerned over China’s rise, they are gradually establishing more cooperation, notably in security terms. India is following a similar policy with Japan and Australia, two other powers that are worried over the initiatives of the PRC. Together, these four states form the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, an informal framework to ensure stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Two other noteworthy partners for India are Israel and the EU. The relations with the former are complicated by India’s tilts towards Iran, but the Jewish State remains an important partner as an arms supplier and for technological cooperation. On its part, the EU has a central role for India’s trade. Lastly, it should also be mentioned that New Delhi is increasing its economic cooperation with Africa as well.

Conclusion: India at the crossroad

This overview allows to draw some conclusion on India’s current and future role. The country finds itself at a crossroad. It has all the potential to emerge as a major world power, but to achieve this objective it must successfully solve the multiple challenges it is facing. Only time will tell to what extent it will manage to, but what is sure is that India is a power to monitor, and that in any case it will have a considerable impact in world affairs in the coming years.

This article was originally commissioned and first published by KJ Vids. It was written by Alessandro Gagaridis. You can visit his website at www.strategikos.it. Please request permission to info@kjvids.co.uk before re-posting.

Why does INDIA NEED AFGHANISTAN? – KJ VIDS

What are India’s Interests in Afghanistan and why does India need Afghanistan so much?

India has sought to establish its presence in Afghanistan from the early days of its independence from Britain in 1947. In 1950, Afghanistan and India signed a “Friendship Treaty.” India had robust ties with Afghan King Zahir Shah’s regime. Prior to the Soviet invasion in 1979, New Delhi continued to formalized agreements and protocols with various pro-Soviet regimes in Kabul. But what are India’s strategic political and economic interests there? In this video, we will look at India’s interests in Afghanistan.

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The Geopolitics of Kashmir

China, India and Pakistan, all three of which are nuclear states, have vital strategic interests in Kashmir.

Kashmir shares borders with Afghanistan, a country where South Asia meets Central Asia.

Central Asia is a geographic bridge between Europe and other parts of Asia.

Kashmir is a vital geographic component to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the China-Pakistan-Economic-Corridor (CPEC).

Besides the benefits of connecting to Europe and elsewhere, there are other advantages in access to Central Asia.

The region is home to huge natural resources, hydrocarbons and minerals, which both China and India are craving.

Furthermore, the landlocked region’s consumer markets – a population of 70 million – are open for exploitation.

Kashmir’s geographic accessibility to Central Asia – via Afghanistan – makes the position of Kashmir, very significant.

Pakistan intends to use infrastructure built under the CPEC initiative to connect ‘directly by-land’ to both China and Central Asia.

For its part, China wants to secure access to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean via CPEC to avoid naval blockades.

China’s access to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean would ensure a Chinese naval presence close to India’s waters.

India also wants to create a trade route linking Afghanistan, Central Asia, Russia and Europe.

Currently, India have to sail through the Arabian Sea to reach Iranian ports from which freight then proceeds over land.

But India’s regional connectivity plans known as the “International North-South Corridor” are time-consuming and costly.

If it wasn’t for Pakistan-Kashmir which stands between India-administered Kashmir and Afghanistan, India would have had a ‘direct by-land’ route access to Afghanistan, Central Asia, Russia, and Europe.

As well as trade routes, the glacial waters that flow via Kashmir provide water and electricity to a billion people in India.

Pakistan also relies heavily on glacial waters flowing from the region to prop up its agricultural sector.

With an increased need for electricity, India has looked to the region to develop more hydro facilities.

Pakistan fears that India may divert water necessary for irrigation, and use water as a weapon against Pakistan.

Kashmir is thus a major national security issue for both nations, the control of which could pose an existential threat to the other.

Kashmir will remain a major national security for both India and Pakistan, as well as play a critical role for China.

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The Geopolitics of Bangladesh

South Asia is a region of great significance in world politics. Geopolitically, the region plays a vital role in the world economy.

Bangladesh is surrounded by India almost entirely on three sides except for a small but significant border with Myanmar.

For India, Bangladesh’s location is a strategic wedge between mainland India and India’s North Eastern states.

Each of the seven states of the Indian Union is land-locked and has a shorter route to the sea through Bangladesh.

The navigable rivers in India’s Northeast that could connect West Bengal or Orissa ports pass through Bangladesh.

The only entry to and exit from the North-eastern region of India is the Shiliguri Corridor that is close to the Chinese border.

Bangladesh provides easy land access to Southeast Asian countries that are important for India’s Look East Policy.

 

Bangladesh has also been constantly important in China’s foreign policy since military and economic ties began in 1976.

The growing connectivity and possible land connection enhances Bangladesh’s importance to China.

In it’s quest for natural resources, China is known to have interest in Bangladesh’s energy sector.

China enjoys access to the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar, which is very important in the context of Sino-US-India geopolitics.

The Relationship with China also enhances Bangladesh’s strategic relationship with Myanmar.

Myanmar is seen as an important linchpin in the strategic equation in north Bay of Bengal, hotly contested by China and India.

Washington : President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi hug while making statements in the Rose Garden of the White House in Washington, Monday, June 26, 2017. AP/PTI(AP6_27_2017_000042B)

In this context, the Indo-US relations are regarded as synergic moves by both to counter Chinese influence in South Asia.

The US attention is drawn towards Chinese incursion in the Indian Ocean that is critical in the event of East Asian conflicts.

The Top 5 Countries with the Highest Percentage of Underweight Children

Hunger is a worldwide problem, Hundreds die every hour from starvation, and the problem will not fade away anytime soon. In this video, we count down the top five Countries with the highest percentage of underweight children.

Bangladesh

Bangladesh’s population is large in 2015 the population was at a grand 161 million, and 36.8% of the child population were underweight and 16.7% where undernourished. Bangladesh still cannot provide its people with a fair amount of nutritious foods, says a global report on hunger. Bangladesh has slipped further to 90th position in the hunger index out of 118 countries, showing a 17-notch fall from the previous year’s 73rd place. The country ranked 57 the year before (2014).

Niger

Niger is a vast desert country and one of the poorest on earth. Millions of people, a third of the population, face food shortages. 51.2% of children in Niger are underweight, Starving or malnourished. Aid agencies estimate that tens of thousands of children are in the advanced stages of starvation. Children are dying daily in the few feeding centres there are, where their place in the queue could make the difference between life and death.

Yemen

17 million Yemenis are hungry That’s 2/3 of the country’s population. It is one of the largest food crisis in the world in this country Almost half the population is on the edge of famine. … It’s a huge crisis. The situation? 43.1%  Children are underweight and 25.7% malnourished.

Yemen grows little of its own food, and must import 90 percent of all its goods, but the war has severely limited imports. A naval blockade by Saudi Arabia, with US support, slows maritime traffic and imposes time-consuming inspections. Damage to the country’s largest deep-water port, has further slowed World Food Program deliveries.

India

India with a population of over 1.2 billion, has seen tremendous growth in the past two decades. Gross Domestic Product has increased 4.5 times and per capita consumption has increased 3 times. Similarly, food grain production has increased almost 2 times. However, despite phenomenal industrial and economic growth and while India produces sufficient food to feed its population, it is unable to provide access to food to a large number of people, especially women and children. 194 million people are undernourished in India. By this measure India is home to a quarter of the undernourished population in the world. Also 48% of women between 15 and 49 years of age are anaemic and 44% of children under 5 are underweight.

Somalia

Somalia is ranked number 1 on our list as 45.3% are underweight and 38% are malnourished. 6 million people in Somalia are considered ‘food insecure’. 360,000 Children in Somalia are malnourished. Without Water there can be no crops, no crops = no food and the severe water issue in Somalia is rising, Somalis try to gather water any way they can. Communities drill deep bores 200 to 400 metres underground to access groundwater. Shallow wells are dug in the mountains and dams are built to collect surface water. Trucking in water is also common, where water trucks come periodically to refill water reservoirs called berkads. But these methods do not always provide safe and reliable sources for drinking water.

References

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2224rank.html

http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4030e.pdf

http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4030e.pdf

http://www.poverty.com/

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