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Geopolitics

Brexit and Britain’s Geopolitics

Brexit is one of the most debated geopolitical issues of our time. More than two years after the referendum that resulted in the decision to leave the EU, it is still unclear what the exit conditions will be like and the prospects of a “no deal” Brexit are looming at the horizon. With such high degree of uncertainty, it is difficult to foresee how things will eventually unfold, but one thing is certain: Brexit will have a sensible impact on Britain in the years to come.

Britain’s geopolitics & history

The history and the foreign policy of the United Kingdom have been deeply marked by its geographic position. As an island off the European coasts, not far from France, it was isolated enough to be sufficiently repaired from foreign threats but close enough to be obliged to care about the Continent’s affairs. Since William the Conqueror’s conquest in 1066, no invader managed to land on the British soil. After a long process marked by turmoil and civil war, a unified kingdom of Great Britain was established in the early 18th century. Thanks to its favourable position protracted towards the Atlantic Ocean, it managed to consolidate and expand its colonial territories. This, combined with its rich coal deposits and with an institutional system favouring capitalism and the technological innovation, allowed Britain to spark the industrial revolution. Gradually, Britain strengthened its fleet and turned into the world’s leading naval power. The Royal Navy became the cornerstone of its national security and the vehicle of its imperial expansion: its supremacy allowed Britain to impede any invasion from the mainland, but at the same time enabled it to extend its influence overseas and dominate maritime trade. Back then it acted as the “balancer” of European politics: when any given power starter becoming too powerful and consequently threatening for its national security, Britain backed a coalition to counter its rise; sometimes intervening directly with its army such as during the Napoleonic Wars. At the height of its power in the second-half of the 19th century, the British Empire ruled over one quarter of the world and was the first power of its time.

But America’s rise and two World Wars determined its decline. After 1945, Britain gradually lost its immense colonial empire and its industry was disrupted by foreign competition. To ensure its security it joined NATO, the trans-Atlantic military Alliance supported by the US to contain the Soviet Union. On the political and economic level, Britain was initially cautious towards the European Integration project, and preferred to promote its own multilateral institutions like the Commonwealth and the European Free Trade Association. Yet, in 1973 it decided to join the European Economic Community, the predecessor of the EU. Nevertheless, its relations with the EU have always been turbulent. It opposed several integration initiatives and exerted its “opt out” right over several issues, albeit in different forms. In 1992, it rejected to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism and any obligation to adopt the Euro. Another opt out exists on the Schengen agreement abolishing borders controls, which was integrated in the EU legislation in 1997 and that Britain had not signed. It also refrained from accepting the EU’s legislation on police and criminal justice in the context of the Area of freedom, security and justice. A last opt-out exists over the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights included in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty; and its aim is to limit the influence of EU norms on cases brought to British courts.

Then, amid a global rise of populist forces opposed to greater social and economic integration, the Brexit referendum took place in 2016. After a long and heated campaign, the vote resulted in the victory of those advocating for leaving the EU. Since then, in accordance with the EU’s legislation, the UK has been involved in complex negotiations with the Union to define the terms of Brexit. As of today, the Parliament has rejected the plan backed by PM May’s government and an agreement is yet to be reached. A “no deal” Brexit seems more and more likely. In this context of growing uncertainty, the future of the UK and even its tenure as a unified state are being questioned.

The challenges of Brexit

The first set of problems related to Brexit is economic in nature. Since before the referendum, it was widely debated how the UK would perform out of the EU; with opposing and often contradicting opinions coming from the two sides. Determining its impact is still complicated, as the final terms of Brexit remain unclear; and considering the rumours about an extension of the negotiations it is probable that the situation will continue being uncertain. Yet, a few points seem to be generally accepted. First, leaving the EU will damage Britain’s economic growth. This does not mean a contraction of the GDP, but that it will probably grow at a slower pace if the UK leaves the Union.  In the job market, some sectors are likely to be damaged by losing access to the common market, while those mostly exposed to competition from other EU members are likely to benefit from Brexit. The service sectors is particularly important in this regard: it is a major driver of job creation and of innovation, and leaving the single EU market could damage them by reducing the inflow of qualified workers from the continent. In regards to public finances, leaving the Union surely means not having to pay contributions to its budget, but estimates indicate that any saving would be offset with just a GDP contraction of 1% compared to the non-Brexit scenario; and the balance would be negative if the loss were greater. Brexit would also mean losing EU funds to universities, farming and regional development. A positive aspect of Brexit could be the reduction of regulations deriving from EU legislation, but in some cases regulation and standardization is beneficial. Moreover, those British companies wishing to continue trading with the EU will have to comply with its regulations, with the difference from now that Britain will no longer have any voice in determining them. All in all, most analyses expect Brexit to have a negative impact on the economy of the UK; even though there are some who disagree. But again, determining its real effects is extremely complicated and a fully accurate forecast is simply impossible, especially as long as the final terms of Brexit are unknown.

Another major point of discussion is the future of Scotland and Northern Ireland. In 2016, two-thirds of Scots voted in favour of remaining in the EU. Scotland has close and expanding trade ties with continental Europe, and its local government is keener of accepting immigration as a mean to balance its aging population. Until now, it seems that Brexit has not increased much the support for Scottish independence, but much depends on the final terms of the agreement: if its terms were contrary to Scotland’s economic interests, then the pro-independence side would surely gain strength and could win in the case of a new independence referendum, an option which is already being discussed. For what concerns Northern Ireland, Brexit could threaten the equilibrium established by the 1998 “Good Friday” peace deal. The region receives considerable funding from the EU, and most importantly the London’s exit from the Union could translate in the reintroduction of a “hard” border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the island; with considerable economic and social problems. A potential solution is the so-called “Irish backstop”, meaning allowing the area to remain in the EU common market and custom union until a definitive settlement is reached. Yet, there are fears that Brexit could end up sparking the violent conflict in the area after more than 20 years.

Post-Brexit Britain

As seen, it is nearly impossible to determine how Britain will look like after it leaves the EU. Surely, while it can abandon the Union. It cannot escape geography: it will remain a European country and will have to work together with its partners on the continent on common issues such as terrorism, transnational crime, trade & finance, and more. But this means that while it would recover part of the sovereignty it ceded to the EU when it decided to join, in practice it will still have to comply with many European legislation without being able to influence it any longer. Of course, the UK can try balancing the negative effects by creating deeper ties with other partners, but geography limits it to the United States; and as long as the wave of protectionism initiated by Trump continues, it will be difficult to reach a deal in advantageous terms for the UK. In reality, there is another solution: China and Japan. As the Arctic ice cap melts, the Northern Sea Route becomes a viable trade route for trade with Asia, thus opening new opportunities for Britain. The exploitation of the Arctic’s resources is also an option to boost the British economy. Yet, this process is still in its early stages and will take decades to fully develop its potential, not to speak of the dangers for the delicate Arctic environment.

To conclude, it is hard to anticipate what the impact of Brexit will be. Many supporters considered it as the only way to restore Britain’s sovereignty and pursue its national interest in full autonomy, but geography makes it impossible for the UK to simply isolate itself from the continent and therefore it will need to find a new equilibrium for the post-Brexit period; but this will a long and complex task, that might even threaten its unity as a state.

That’s all for today guys, thanks for watching another KJ Vid. What are your views on Brexit. Do you think it will actually go ahead or will Britain remain in the EU. We would love to hear from you in the comments below. Don’t forget to support KJ Vid by becoming a KJ member on our website kjvids.co.uk. Thanks for watching again and see you next time. 

The geopolitics of the Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean is an immense maritime space of great geopolitical and geoeconomic importance. It is a crossroad for sea trade that connects the advanced economies of the East and the West. At the same time, there are also many factors that threaten its stability. These are often closely related with the international dynamics of the Asia-Pacific, to the point that the two areas can be considered as single reality.

West: Challenges and Opportunities for Africa

On its western part, the Indian Ocean touches the shores of the vast African continent. This creates a peculiar mix of opportunities and challenges for coastal states like South Africa, Mozambique, Madagascar, Tanzania and Kenya. Thanks to their position, they can easily reach important economic areas such as India, the Middle East, Europe and the Asia-Pacific. Engaging in maritime trade with these regions could provide a major economic boost to these African states and improve the living conditions of their citizens. In addition, emerging powers like China and India are heavily spending in Africa to access its much-needed natural resources and exploit the opportunities for high investment returns. Yet, in the case of China, this also raises concerns. While African states welcome Chinese investments as they come with no legal precondition on the respect of civil and human rights, some worry that its economic penetration might result in political leverage and in a form of economic neo-colonialism.

There are also two states whose situation is particular. The first is Ethiopia, the powerhouse of the Horn of Africa. As other states along the continent’s eastern coast, it can greatly benefit from international sea trade, but unfortunately it is a landlocked country. This largely explains the recent deal it reached with Eritrea to settle their longstanding conflict: turning Eritrea into a friend would enable Ethiopia to access the sea and engage in maritime trade along one of the busiest routes in the world. As a matter of fact, the Red Sea is an obliged passage for ships sailing between Europe and Asia. Ethiopia has even expressed its intention to build a navy, which is a clear sign of its seafaring ambitions.

The second peculiar case is Somalia. In theory, it is also poised to take advantage from its position on the Indian Ocean, but in practice it is a failed state ruled by armed groups where the central government has not enough power to pursue such kind of maritime policy.

This raises the issue of the threats to sea trade along the Western shores of the Indian Ocean. Somalia is part of the problem, as it has become a hub for piracy. The difficult economic conditions have pushed many Somalis to start attacking cargos navigating along the country’s coasts. This became a serious problem that prompted the international community to organize a military operation to patrol the Somali waters and combat piracy. These efforts succeeded in securing the area and in reducing the number of attacks, but as long as the socio-economic conditions of coastal population do not improve, the risk of piracy will remain.

Then, there are two important chokepoints that connect the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean via the Red Sea, which can be considered as a peripheral area of the Indian Ocean putting it in communication with Europe: first, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait; second, the Suez Canal. Both passages are essential for sea trade, and any interruption would have a major impact on the global economy.

North: India & Hormuz

Located to the North, India is certainly the main regional player. A large and fast-growing economy, it is one of today’s most important rising powers and its influence is growing worldwide. New Delhi considers the Indian Ocean as “its own” maritime space, a vector for power projection and economic growth but also an area to be preserve from the intromissions of hostile powers for the sake of national security. India can enormously benefit from its position protracting towards the ocean midway along the vital East-West sea lanes, and in fact it already taking advantage from it. At the same time, by building a powerful navy it can extend its power abroad and protect its interests. As a matter of fact, New Delhi is concerned over the presence of foreign actors in the Indian Ocean, most notably Beijing. The PRC is indeed investing heavily in the region on the basis of its Maritime Silk Road plan, aimed at creating a string of ports to sustain trade with Europe. This is of central importance for China’s economy, which relies on sea trade for exporting goods and importing hydrocarbons; but some consider that the real objective of the project is to extend its influence in the region by economic means. In a context of broader Sino-Indian rivalry, New Delhi worries about Beijing’s presence in countries like the Maldives or Sri Lanka, considering it as a potential threat to its security. Similarly, India also sees unfavorably the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor that will connect the PRC with the ocean via the port of Gwadar.

Again, there is also a strategic chokepoint to consider: the Hormuz Strait, which connects the Persian Gulf with the Indian Ocean. This passage is vital for tankers carrying Middle Eastern oil to Europe and Asia and any interruption would have catastrophic economic consequences. Unfortunately, this is not a remote event: in case of a serious standoff between the US and Iran, the Strait would soon become a major flashpoint, since Teheran’s deterrence strategy is largely based on blocking the Strait; which it can do with relative ease due to geographic reasons.

East: the Indo-Pacific

To the East, the Indonesian archipelago and Australia separate the Indian Ocean from the Pacific. Similarly to Somalia, the waters around Indonesia had become infested with pirates in the recent past; and the phenomenon has been reduced only thanks to multilateral military and development efforts. Yet, if the living conditions of coastal populations deteriorated again, the problem may arise once more.

That said, Indonesia and Australia benefit from their position between the two oceans. It allows them to project their power in both directions, to reach the large European and East Asian markets and finally to access Africa with its resources and its potential for investments. Indonesia is particularly relevant in this regard: it is another emerging economy with a great potential, and its virtually controls all the major straits connecting the two oceans: Sunda, Lombok and most importantly Malacca. Indonesia’s growth is largely due to its position on these sea lanes, and Singapore has based its incredible wealth on it. Again, these passages are essential for maritime trade between Europe and Asia as well as for the latter’s energy security; and would become hotspots in case of war, notably between the US and China. If the US Navy closed them, it could seriously harm the tenure of the PRC’s economy. At the same time, they are also essential for American allies like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan; meaning that the US will use its naval power to ensure no hostile power blocks the Straits.

The eastern part of the Indian Ocean plays a fundamental role for maritime security; and the importance of the juncture between the two Oceans is leading many scholars, analysts and policy-makers to consider them as a single maritime region: the Indo-Pacific. The Indian Ocean is extremely important for states in East Asia because it represents the necessary passage to reach Europe; and the security dynamics of the Indian Ocean and of the Asia-Pacific are closely related. China’s New Silk Road initiative, the forays of its Navy in the waters of the Indian Ocean, the Sino-Indian competition, the free flow of oil from the Gulf and piracy in Indonesia are all strategic issues that tie the two oceanic regions. This explains why the concept of Indo-Pacific is also taking importance in American strategic discourse: the economic and security dynamics of the two areas are so intertwined that they must be considered as a single space. Other powers are applying the same logic, and this is having practical consequences: the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue uniting the US, Japan, India and Australia indicates their willingness to strengthen their political and military cooperation to face shared security challenges like the rise of China; and it represents the emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a political and strategic reality.

Conclusion: an Indo-Pacific future?

Many scholars believe that “the future is Asian”, which is even the title of a recent book by Parag Khanna. But Asia’s rise largely depends on trade with Europe and on oil imports from the Middle East across the Indian Ocean. As such, Asian states have major strategic concerns in this area. China, Japan and South Korea need to keep the sea lanes open. India is an emerging power whose influence is growing across the world via the sea. Indonesia is the pivot connecting the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. The United States, the world’s primary security provider, is facing many challenges in both Oceans and is committed to preserving the freedom of navigation. Moreover, the interests of the various stakeholders in the area are sometimes colliding, such as in the case of China and India. As such, with Asia’s importance growing every year in both economic and political terms, the Indo-Pacific is also gaining primary strategic relevance.

That’s all for today guys, thanks for watching another KJ Vid. What are your views on Italy’s recession. Will Italy recover or implode and potentially leave the EU. We would love to hear your views in the comments below especially if you are from Italy.

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Stabalizing Iraq and Syria

After years of war, it appears that Iraq and Syria are gradually stabilizing. The government forces supported by the US and Russia respectively are restoring their control over the two countries, and the self-proclaimed Islamic State has lost virtually all of its territory. Yet, this may just be an ephemeral peace. The social and economic foundations of the two states remain shaky at best, and many issues are still unsettled; notably the role of Sunni Arabs and the future of the Kurds. Without a comprehensive action to solve such questions, peace in Iraq and Syria will not be achieved on a solid basis.

I’m your host Kasim, welcome to another KJ Vid. In this video we will discuss the future of Iraq and Syria. Just before we begin, we would like to invite you to our Patreon account where you can get the full reports and other perks for our content. Supporting us on Patreon helps to keep our channel independent and create more videos.

Iraq and Syria in chaos

Iraq has been ravaged by conflict with practically no interruption since the US invasion in 2003. The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime destabilized the country and resulted in a long insurgency against the occupying American forces. Progress in state-building was slow and limited in scope. The US ultimately withdrew its troops from the country in 2011 by a decision of then-President Barack Obama; but Iraq was still too weak to ensure the authority of the central government over all of the territory. In the same year, the Arab Spring broke out all over the Middle East. In Syria, it rapidly degenerated into a violent civil war opposing the loyalists to President Bashar al-Assad and the rebels; a broad term indicating various armed groups of different affiliation, ranging from those who favoured Western-like democracy and jihadist groups.

Things got more complicated in 2014 with the rise of a Sunni extremist group that would later become known as Islamic State. Exploiting the chaos that reigned in Syria due to the civil war and the power vacuum caused by the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, it took control of large swathes of lands in the northern parts of the two countries. In particular, it seized important facilities such as oil fields and dams in Iraq and it even threatened Baghdad. This prompted the US to organize a multinational coalition to support the Iraqi government in its fight against the terrorist group by deploying special forces and by conducting air strikes. Soon, they also started operating in Syria, where the conflict was about to turn into a major international matter involving various foreign powers that supported the government or the rebels to pursue their own interest.

Russia intervened actively since 2015 to sustain Bashar al-Assad, its main ally in the area. Western powers assisted the rebels and bombed facilities to punish the loyalists for allegedly using chemical weapons against civilians. Turkey, who opposed the al-Assad government, became directly involved in 2016 with the main objective of preventing the formation of some kind of Kurdish territorial entity. As a matter of fact, the Kurds had rapidly proved to be an effective combat force in fighting the IS, and received support from the American-led coalition. This allowed them to take control over a large strip of territory at the border with Turkey, who feared the area would become independent or at least a rear base for Kurdish fighters operating against its territory. As such, it conducted several military operations to secure the lands along its borders and expel Kurdish forces. Iran also took part to the war by sending weapons and troops in support of al-Assad on the basis of the common Shia faith and of converging geopolitical interest. To counter its growing influence, Israel also carried out airstrikes in Syria against Iranian outposts.

Now, it seems that the two intertwined conflicts are about to end. In Syria the government is slowly restoring its authority and the Islamic State has lost almost all of the territory it controlled there and in Iraq. Yet, many issues remain unresolved, notably the role of Sunni Arabs and the Kurdish question.

Sunni Arabs: excluded from power

Sunni Arabs belong to the largest of the two main branches of Islam, the other being the Shias. But even though they are a majority in the Ummah as a whole, their situation in Iraq and Syria is particular.

For what concerns the former, Sunnis are indeed a minority. Most Iraqis are Shias, which also means that they are politically closer Iran, the main centre of Shiism. Yet, Sunnism had its glorious days in the country. During the Middle Ages, Baghdad was the heart of the mighty Abbasid Caliphate, from which today’s Islamic State took many symbols. More recently, Sunni Arabs formed the ruling elite in Iraq during the years of Saddam’s rule. His Ba’athist regime was dominated by Sunnis, which meant that in Iraq a minority was ruling over the majority. But the situation was reversed after Saddam was overthrown following the US invasion in 2003. Since Sunnis had formed the backbone of Saddam’s dictatorship, they were removed from their posts and largely excluded from power to the benefit of the Shias. At that point, the Sunni Arab community became the main pool of recruitment for the anti-American insurgency and then for the Islamic State. The situation has improved since then, but properly integrating Sunnis in Iraqi political life remains a central matter to stabilize the country.

The situation of Sunnis in Syria is the opposite and resembles that of Iraq under Saddam, albeit inverted. Sunni Arabs form the majority of Syria’s population, but the governing elite belongs to the Alawite movement, which is a sect of Shia Islam. This generated much resentment among Sunnis, who felt politically emarginated. As a result, many of them joined the ranks of the rebels when the uprising started in 2011. Now, the government seems close to prevailing, but it will have to establish a more inclusive form of governance to ensure peace in the long term.

The Kurds: a stateless people

In the case of the Kurds, the problem is slightly different. Here, it is not about a religious divide, but rather an ethnic and linguistic one. The Kurds are mostly Sunni and speak their own separate language, and as a single people they count around 40 million individuals. They live in a region located at the crossroad of Syria, Turkey, Iran and Iraq. Yet, their demands for an independent state have systematically been frustrated, and today they remain a stateless nation with little prospects of getting their own independent country.

Yet, they play an important political role. The lands where they live include the oil-rich areas of northern Iraq. The Kurdistan’s Workers Party, or PKK, has been waging a decade-long insurgency against Turkey to obtain independency or at least autonomy for Kurdistan; but Ankara has always firmly opposed their demands without hesitating to use violence and there is no indication that things will change anytime soon. In Iraq, several tens of thousand Kurds were killed by Saddam’s regime during the ‘80s in what is known as Anfal genocide. Later on, Iraqi and Syrian Kurds became America’s most effective on-the-ground allies in the fight against the Islamic State. But this angered Turkey out of fear that Kurdish-controlled territory could turn into an independent state or a base for operations on Turkish soil. As such, Ankara dispatched its military several times to secure Kurdish areas along its borders. However, this has led to a clash with the US, in a moment when bilateral relations are already strained. Washington has been supporting the Kurds and needs to reward them somehow; but any concession implying autonomy would upset Ankara, who is also an important ally. At the same time, Turkey cannot defy the US because the political and possibly economic retaliation might be too harmful. This has resulted into a stalemate that remains unresolved.

As in the case of Sunni Arabs, solving the Kurdish question will be of central importance for ensuring a long-lasting peace in Iraq and Syria, but finding a common agreement is even more difficult in this case: it is not a mainly domestic matter, but a transnational one involving various stakeholders, which makes finding a solution an even more complex endeavour.

Conclusion: ensuring inclusivity

As we have seen, conflict resolution in Iraq and Syria demands to integrate both Sunni Arabs and Kurds in the social and political life of the two countries. This is essential for granting peace in the long term: if Sunnis are not adequately represented, the Islamic State or a similar organization may soon rise again; while the Kurds may take arms and start a large-scale insurgency that would be difficult to tackle. Unfortunately, actually doing so is not easy. Both groups have powerful enemies and are internally fragmented, and other players can exploit these divisions for their own interests. As a matter of fact, major powers like the US, Russia, Iran and Turkey all have their own interests in the area; which is another complicating factor. In addition, given the large number of tribes, parties, armed factions, ethnic groups that live in Iraq and Syria, finding an agreement that satisfies everyone is extremely difficult. But to prevent the emergence of new jihadist groups or a new violent phase of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict and to ensure the stabilization of Iraq and Syria, a solution must be found in this sense.

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Geopolitics of Brazil

Brazil is South America’s emerging power. It is the largest and most populous country in the continent; and it benefits from a favourable geographic position, important natural resources and a growing economy. As such, it is taking a more active international role both in the region and beyond. Yet, it must also face notable challenges; notably corruption, criminality, inequality and others; all of which may undermine its rise as a great power.

Geography and Brazil’s rise

Like any other country, Brazil’s geopolitics can be examined as a combination of three factors: dimension, configuration and position.

Brazil covers a total area of about 8,515,000 square kilometres, making of it the 5th country in the world in terms of size. This puts Brazil in a favourable position to dominate the continent, as it can access any region with relative ease. Similarly, its 7,500 kilometres-long coastline on the Atlantic Ocean enables Brazil to easily project its power abroad and to engage in lucrative maritime trade.

In terms of configuration, Brazil’s territory can roughly be divided in two parts. The north-west is centred on the Amazon river basin and its vast rainforest, the largest in the world and a real treasure in terms of biodiversity. The south-east is made up of ridges and mountain ranges crossed by the Parana river. As a matter of facts, watercourses are an important feature in Brazil’s geography: the country has a complex hydrographic system that brings significant benefits to electric power generation and agriculture, which is also favoured by Brazil’s warm climate. Most of Brazil’s 208 million citizens, the majority of which are young people, live in the cities along the coast. This has resulted into vast metropolis where economic prosperity meets overcrowded slums.

But position is Brazil’s most important characteristic. It borders ten nations, meaning all the countries in South America except Ecuador and Chile. None of its neighbours represents a real threat, and not only because relations are generally good: Brazil is simply more powerful than any of them. Even Argentina, the second most influent country in the continent, cannot seriously challenge Brazil’s supremacy due to a worse geopolitical and economic situation. Other states are not a real matter of concern; yet, they are important for Brazil’s own geopolitical ambitions. Brazil wants to extend its influence westwards to connect the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans so to unlock its innermost territories, become the centre of coast-to-coast trade and increase its regional influence. To reach this objective, Brazil needs to keep the URAPABOL area in its sphere of influence. This zone takes its name after the three states composing it: Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia. They are seen as South America’s geopolitical pivot, meaning that the power who controls them can extend its influence over all the continent and obtain a dominant position. Moreover, the URAPABOL states were also seen as useful buffer zone against foreign threats and Argentina in particular; even though today the likelihood of a war is really remote. For these reasons, Brazil is attentive to maintain a solid political, economic and demographic presence in these three countries. But Brazil’s is also located along the Atlantic’s coasts, meaning that it can easily reach the large American and European markets to the North; as well as Africa with its natural resources and many fast-growing economies. So, Brazil also wants to become a naval power to boost its economy and develop its Navy to project its power abroad.

Brazil’s economic & military outlook

Apart from geography, Brazil also has natural resources, a considerable economic potential and important military means.

Brazil is certainly South America’s leading economy, but its outlook is made of mixed figures. This year, its GDP is projected to reach 1.9 thousand billion dollars, which goes to 3.5 thousand in terms of Purchasing Power Parity. The expected growth rate is of 2.4% in current prices. Brazil was at the 9th place on the list of the world’s largest economies in 2018, and it is expected to reach the 5th position by 2050. Its per capita GDP will stand around 16.7 thousand dollars in 2019, a relatively low figure to be combined with an unequal distribution of wealth. After years of high inflation, the price growth seems to have stabilized at around 3.5%. The debt of the central government is on the rise, amounting to almost 79% of the GDP in 2017, Along with a slight budget deficit of around 1%, this trend can become problematic in the long term. Unemployment affects 10.7% of the population today, and 4% of Brazilians lived below the poverty line in 2016. The trade balance has been in constant surplus for years, sustained by agriculture and manufacturing exports. As a matter of fact, Brazil is a true agronomic giant and its industry is also developing in many sectors. In addition, it also hosts significant hydrocarbon and mineral reserves, and is a leading producer of biogas. However, this has negative environmental consequences: huge swathes of the Amazon rainforest have been cut to grow the crops required for producing biogas; and also for other reasons like timber production. Brazil has nuclear reactors for energy generation and infrastructures are being improved, but much work remains to be done.

This overview shows that Brazil is indeed an emerging country, but like other economies in analogous conditions it has still considerable challenges to deal with. Corruption, poverty and inequality continue affecting its economy. This has important repercussions on the country’s political life, since similar matters are a cause of social unrest and high crime rates. In fact, Jair Bolsonaro has been elected President largely out of promises of tackling corruption, reforming the economy and crushing criminality.

Brazil is the main power in South America also in military terms. It spends regularly more than 1.32% of its GDP on defence, and it possesses large and well-equipped armed forces who remain politically influential. The Army includes, among others, specialized units for jungle warfare and a vast park of vehicles. It also maintains the Strategic Rapid Action Force, ready to be deployed anywhere in the country at a short notice. In recent years, due to better relations with Argentina and in accordance to its strategy to extend its power westwards, it has relocated many units in the Amazon area. The Air Force operates fighters, cargos and airborne warning & control planes. But the Navy is the most notable component of the Brazilian military, as it is a powerful mean of power projection. Today, it includes diesel-electric submarines, landing ships and a helicopter carrier plus naval aviation and marines; and it also plans to deploy a nuclear-powered attack submarine by 2025. Finally, Brazil also possesses a considerable defence industry and carries on its own space program.

Brazil’s foreign relations

Brazil’s foreign policy is largely based on multilateralism. It maintains pretty good relations with its neighbours, and it is a member of the main regional bodies like the Organization of American States, the Union of South American Nations and the Southern Common Market; where it plays an important role in promoting integration. It provides economic aid to developing countries, notably African ones; but this is also motivated by economic interests, like accessing resources and opening new markets for Brazilian firms. It also takes part to UN missions and promotes the enlargement of the UN Security Council. Moreover, it is a member of the informal BRICS group along with Russia, India, China and South Africa; and it keeps cooperating with all of them all while maintaining good ties with the US and with European countries.

Now that Bolsonaro is President, US-Brazil relations will receive a boost: Bolsonaro is openly pro-American and share many similar views with Trump: they oppose immigration, they are close to Christian and conservative groups, they promise to crush criminality and fight terrorism, they are favourable to death penalty, they support the rights of gun owners, their economic policy focuses on privatization and deregulation at home while protecting their industry from foreign competition by introducing tariffs, they criticize authoritarian regimes and are very friendly towards Israel and other pro-US states like Japan or South Korea, and they are hostile to foreign (and especially Chinese) economic penetration in their countries. Since Brazil is the main power in South America and the only one capable of countering US supremacy to some degree, Bolsonaro’s election is a gift for America: it virtually ensures that Brazil will remain friendly and that it will oppose rival powers like China and Russia. Both of them are indeed expanding their presence in South America to access resources and to subtract the area from American influence, but now their efforts risk being thwarted. Nevertheless, China remains a central economic partner for Brazil, and along with Russia it will continue to extend its presence in South America. Brazil, on its part, will maintain its multilateral approach to diversify its partnerships, maximize its benefits and increase its global influence.

Conclusion

Brazil is South America’s main power and its influence in international affairs will certainly increase in the future. Yet, its economic growth is not as spectacular as China’s or India’s; and it has to face many challenges like poverty and inequality, environmental degradation, corruption and social unrest. All such factors will limit its geopolitical role. But Brazil, is that contrarily to other emerging countries, it is not involved in rivalries with other states and it is not challenging the existing international order. Instead, it focuses on multilateralism and mutually-beneficial cooperation. This is probably the most remarkable aspect of Brazil’s rise: at least by now, it looks that it will be peaceful and not destabilizing.

5 Geopolitical Trends to watch in 2019

In today’s globalised world, many geopolitical events take place every year, and they have a long-lasting effects in time. So, considering what happened on the international scene in the year that has just ended, what are the top five global trends to watch in 2019?

1 – “America first”, America alone?

President Trump’s “America First” policy was put into practice various times in 2018. He introduced new tariffs to protect the US economy; he abandoned those agreements that he deemed contrary to America’s national interest; he criticised allies for free-riding on the US in security issues.

This is a trend that will continue as long as Trump remains in the White House, and that will have an important impact on the global order. For decades, the international system was centred on the US and its commitment to sustain its rules and provide security; albeit with limitations and largely for its self-advantage. But now, Washington prefers pursuing a narrow definition of its own national interest. This has already raised concerns with traditional partners; most notably with the European members of NATO to whom he demanded to spend more on defence. This divergence between the two sides of the Atlantic has cast doubts over the tenure of the Alliance. All this happens in a moment of renewed tensions with Russia, who in turn is taking benefit from the situation because in case of a confrontation, it will have to face a more divided and therefore weaker NATO. This uncertainty over the future of the Alliance damages European but also American interests: alienating its traditional allies risks to isolate the US and to reduce its international influence.

All this happens in a delicate moment for the US economy. While its GDP grew of almost 3% in 2018, its monetary policy is object of political debate as Trump accuses the Federal Reserve of being the “only problem” of America’s economy. If the Fed keeps on raising the interest rates to contain inflation, the US growth will slow down. This will also combine with the effects of tariffs plus the considerable public and private debt. Moreover, American stock markets have lost much value in the past year: the price of shares according to the Dow Jones index dropped of around 9.5% in 2018. And if the US economy slows, the rest of the world will follow.

2 – China’s economic slowdown

The world’s second-largest economy is also facing troubles. While it is predicted to grow of about 6.6% this year, which is still extraordinary given its size, the rate is no longer a double-digit figure as in the past. The Chinese economy is also slowing down, and this will inevitable have repercussions on the global scale. As economic prosperity is considered fundamental for social stability and for the rule of the Communist Party, the government is taking measures to maintain a steady growth. This explains various initiatives like “Made in China 2025” aimed at upgrading its industry, the huge investments in high-tech, or the far-reaching “One Belt, One Road” project.

Apart from purely economic issues, this will also have geopolitical consequences. Beijing has been increasing its worldwide presence in the past decade, notably through economic means; but if its growth slows down, its ability to sustain its greater plans in the Asia-Pacific and beyond will suffer. In this sense, the very plans it is implementing to boost its economy may result counterproductive: they are certainly ambitious projects with a great potential, but they are also very challenging. The enormous investments they require will result in a waste of resources if they do not translate into economic growth, and this will hamper China’s economy. As such, observing Beijing’s economic policies and its performance through 2019 will be an indicator of its future global role.

3 – The European (dis)Union

The EU will cross troubled waters in 2019. Anti-EU movements have risen everywhere, its economic recovery remains sluggish and each of its four most important members is not in the position to lead a reform of the common institutions. The United Kingdom will finally leave, but the exact terms are still undefined and a “No Deal” Brexit seems probable. This is the worst scenario, because it means uncertainty for economic and political actors alike. Italy is now ruled by a Eurosceptic coalition that has already clashed with the EU over immigration and economic policy. Germany continues opposing more economic integration in the form of a common fiscal policy, and Angela Merkel’s leadership has been weakened. In France, President Macron is calling for a reform of the EU and promotes further integration, but his popularity is at a record low and the country has first to deal with domestic issues.

Other members are also unable or unwilling to move the integration project ahead. The emerging countries of Central-Eastern Europe, notably Poland and Hungary, want to preserve their sovereignty and therefore oppose devolving more powers to the EU. Moreover, the Union has even initiated the infraction procedure for violation of core values against these two countries, thus leading to an open diatribe. Spain is focused on problems at home; while Greece is heading towards elections in 2019, and any change in its government could make the markets nervous and result in a renewed standoff with the EU.

As such, no state is in the condition to take the lead and move forward the much-needed reform of the Union. However, what is more worrisome is that the divergences do not simply concern the policies to implement, but the basic values of the EU and its very legitimacy are questioned and openly criticised. Considering also its complex institutional procedures, it is unlikely that the stalemate will be solved in 2019. On the contrary, it is likely that the EU will be even more divided at the end of the year.

4 – Sanctions on Iranian oil

Following President Trump’s decision to scrap the nuclear deal, a boycott on Iranian oil will be reintroduced in 2019. Given that it is largely dependent on oil revenues, the Islamic Republic will certainly suffer. The effects will not be only economic, but they will extend to the social sphere as well. Signs of discontent already appeared in late 2017 – early 2018, when mass protests erupted all over the country. As pressure increases on Iran’s economy, similar episodes may repeat in 2019 with destabilising effects on the region. Moreover, this means that Iran will have much less resources to sustain its goals abroad; notably in Iraq and Syria. As a result, it will have to reduce its international commitment and focus on domestic issues.

But this will also affect other countries who used to buy oil from Iran. China and India were its main customers, followed by Japan, South Korea and European countries. As sanctions come back into effect in 2019, such states will comply and change their import sources to avoid angering the US. This will impact the global oil market by putting an upward pressure on its price; even though many effects such as a less than expected demand may nullify this effect at least in part. Finally, while the intended effect of the boycott is to put pressure on the country and force it to negotiate another deal deemed more compatible with America’s interest, it is possible that the result will be the opposite. If Iran feels threatened enough by the US, it may decide to resume its nuclear programme after concluding that is the only way to ensure its national security. This is not likely, because Teheran would be even more isolated, but if this happens the whole region will be further destabilized.

5 – Tension with Russia

Relations between Russia and the US have not improved through 2018. Many important issues continue dividing them, like the war in Syria or Ukraine’s issue. The situation remains volatile in both cases, and the recent Kerch Strait incident has revived tensions between Moscow and Kiev. Additionally, there is another country to watch: Georgia. The new President Salome Zurabishvili has pro-EU Western views and openly calls for Georgia to join the EU and NATO. Russia will hardly accept such a scenario and may launch a military operation to prevent it, thus sparking another crisis in the post-Soviet space.

Moreover, a pillar of the longstanding strategic equilibrium between Russia and NATO has fallen: the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF. This agreement, dating back to the Cold War, prohibited the deployment of intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe, as they risked compromising the nuclear balance in the region: due to their limited range, such weapons enabled the Soviets to strike NATO in Europe without threatening the US territory, thus casting doubts among Europeans that in such an eventuality the Americans would have exposed themselves to retaliation by launching nuclear weapons on the USSR just to protect Europe.

Now that the Treaty is gone, a new arms race is likely to take place, and in fact this is already happening. Russia has tested several nuclear-capable ballistic missiles in 2018, and is rapidly working to deploy new hypersonic missiles capable of travelling at five times the speed of sound or more. The US is doing the same, and both powers are developing new weapon systems and doctrines to prevail on the other. But to pursue these objectives, Russia needs economic resources. Since oil is one of its main sources of revenues, Moscow will seek to coordinate with other producers to keep its price high enough to sustain its economy. This will largely determine the evolution of Russia’s role in 2019, but one thing is sure: Moscow will do its best to pursue its interests abroad, and as the Russian-American rivalry continues, the international scene will remain tense.

Is Saudi pivoting towards Russia?

At a first glance, Saudi Arabia and Russia have not much in common in terms of foreign policy: the former is one of America’s closest allies, whereas the latter is its main geostrategic competitor along with China. But in the complex geopolitics of the Middle East, their bilateral relations are more multifaceted than it may seem; and recent events may drive them closer.

Will Vietnam clash with China over the South China Sea?

Bilateral relations between China and Vietnam are not as easy as it may seem. At a first glance, they may be expected to maintain a positive and flawless partnership due to the similar political system. However, a deeper analysis reveals various divergences between the two countries, whose relations are becoming more conflictual with each passing year.

Historical background

China and Vietnam are both the cradle of ancient civilizations, but we can start examining their history since the two states took their current form in the aftermath of WWII.

After more than a century of intromissions and abuses from the part of Western powers and Japan, in 1945 China was devastated by war and politically divided. After a long and destructive civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists, which dated back to the 30s and was temporarily suspended to form a unified front against the Japanese invasion, the People’s Republic of China was proclaimed in 1949 following the victory of the Communists under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong. On their part, the Nationalists took refuge in Taiwan, where they founded a state that still remains de facto separated from the mainland. Still, the PRC was weak and isolated. It had very few allies apart from the Soviet Union; whose assistance was not sufficient to spark a sensible economic growth. Virtually all the other powers, especially the United States, were hostile to China. Moreover, Beijing’s relations with Moscow soon started deteriorating, to the point that the two seemed to be on the brink of war in 1969, when a series of border clashes took place.

Vietnam also had a troubled history following the end of WWII. France, the ancient colonial power, restored its control over the country after the brief Japanese occupation during the conflict. Yet, the Vietnamese soon started an insurgency that ultimately ousted the French in 1954. Following the negotiations that ended the war, Vietnam was divided in two states separated by the 17th parallel: the communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north and the pro-American Republic of Vietnam in the south. But peace did not last long. One year later, a communist armed movement known as Vietcong was already active in the South, where it tried to overthrow the pro-Washington government. As the situation deteriorated, the US gradually escalated its support to the South, to the point of sending combat troops in the mid-60s. But the massive deployment of forces was not enough to defeat the Vietcong supported by the North and its allies, namely China and the USSR.

By the late 60s, then, both China and Vietnam were communist countries hostile to the US. Yet, things would soon change. After secret talks, the Nixon administration announced an unexpected diplomatic opening to the PRC, which culminated in the President’s visit to the country in 1972. This move was mainly driven by a double fold strategic logic. First, the US wanted to exploit the Sino-Soviet Split to its own advantage by putting the two communist states against each other and thus increase pressure on the USSR. Second, the Americans hoped to convince China to reduce its support to North Vietnam and thus facilitate the negotiations to end of the Vietnam War; and effectively a diplomatic settlement in this sense was reached in 1973. In spite of this, two years later the North launched a full-scale invasion of the South with its regular military forces. Strained by the long and costly war, the US decided to abandon Vietnam; which was therefore reunited under the communist regime.

Since then, the relations between Vietnam and China rapidly deteriorated. On spite of the similar political system, their alignment to the USSR and other regimes in South-East Asia led them to a short war in 1979 where both sides claimed victory; but their relations gradually normalized after the conflict. Later, China started implementing economic reforms, which sparked an extraordinary economic boom that still continues today; albeit at a slower pace. Vietnam followed its example, and today it is a fast-growing economy in full modernization. In both cases, this was not accompanied by political opening, and the respective Communist parties continue being the centre of the political system in each country. But during the past decade, bilateral relations have been worsening once again over a series of issues; and the trend seem to consolidate.

Sino-Vietnamese Disputes

The first and most important dispute existing between Vietnam and China is the one over the Paracel and Spratly islands, both located in the South China Sea, or SCS. This is very complex issue that goes way beyond the Sino-Vietnamese relations; as it involves overlapping claims by multiple countries over a strategic area for maritime trade that is also a rich fishing ground and is believed to host hydrocarbon reserves. Here it is sufficient to say that both China and Vietnam advance claims on the two archipelagos; but it is important to note that the Paracel are all occupied by the PRC. In fact, Beijing considers practically the whole of the SCS as its possession according to the “Nine-Dash Line” theory; and has been increasing its military presence in the area by conducting patrols, by expanding existing islands or even by building artificial ones, and by positioning military hardware and bases on their soil. Its activities have raised much concern in Vietnam and other riparian states; but due to their division and to the marked power imbalance in its favour, China has managed to gradually but firmly stabilizing its position in the SCS.

While this may look like a trivial quarrel over very small islets and rocks, in reality it has a major geostrategic significance. Legitimately controlling a piece of land that is recognized as an island (and not a simple rock) allows states to rightfully claim the territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone around it. Applied to the SCS archipelagos, this means exerting control over vast maritime spaces that are rich in fish and that may host energy resources. Moreover, the SCS is an essential crossing area for sea trade; therefore, any conflict in the area would seriously disrupt the naval traffic with huge consequences for the global economy. Finally, over time the dispute has taken a symbolic relevance, which exacerbates national animosity and further complicates a peaceful resolution of the issue. Notably, a tense standoff between the two countries took place in 2014 following China’s drilling activities in disputed waters, and in March 2018 Vietnam decided to back down and cancel an important oil project in the area. In this sense, it is also important that Vietnam is modernizing its armed forces; with a particular focus on submarines, fighters and fire-and-forget anti-ship missiles. These are all weapon systems that would be useful in the case of a clash with China in the SCS, and it appears indeed that Vietnam is reshaping its military doctrine in this specific optic.

But there are also other divergences between the two countries. Linked to the SCS dispute, an important issue to consider is China’s economic presence in Vietnam. Many Vietnamese fear that the new economic zones established by their government will end up being dominated by Chinese investors. This has created social tensions that have erupted in violent protests in June this year, with demonstrators openly accusing China and its assertive policy in the SCS. Another problem is the question of waterways; notably the Mekong and the Red River, which both originate in Chinese territory. This has significant implications. First, it means that the PRC can control their flow; with major consequences for Vietnam’s agriculture, which still represents an important part of its economy. Second, and linked with the previous aspect, it means that Vietnam is vulnerable to water pollution generated by Chinese factories located upstream.

Another issue is China’s role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN; a regional multilateral organization meant to promote dialogue and cooperation of which Vietnam is part. In regards to ASEAN, China has always been careful not to discuss the SCS dispute during the organization’s meetings, where it could be put in minority by the other states. In contrast, by applying an effective “divide & rule” strategy, the PRC has been capable of dealing with the issue directly with each member; where it can negotiate from a position of force. Moreover, China is expanding its influence over all of ASEAN members; but Vietnam is resisting. This does not exclude some positive trends in Sino-Vietnamese relations. Bilateral trade is important: in 2016, the PRC accounted for 13% of Vietnam’s export for a total worth 26.8 billion dollars; and 31% of the goods that Vietnam purchased came from China, meaning 60 billion dollars in value. Also, in spite of the disputes of the previous year, in 2015 the two countries pledged to keep positive relations. Still, it is clear that Vietnam is concerned over China’s growing leverage over other Southeast Asian countries and over its activities in the SCS; and is therefore reacting.

As a matter of fact, Vietnam is building its ties with other countries in a clear attempt to hedge against China. Hanoi tries not to provoke Beijing and officially continues to apply its “Three No Policy”; meaning no alliance, no foreign military bases on its territory and no relations with a country against a third one. Yet, it is now allowing foreign navies to access the strategic naval base at Cam Ranh Bay for supply and repair; even though it still refuses to lend it to another country. But this example shows that in practice Vietnam is fostering closer political, economic and even military cooperation with other powers like India, Japan, Australia and most importantly the US. Washington is also involved in the SCS dispute, not as a claimant state but as an international security provider, and especially as the guarantor of freedom of navigation. Considering the importance of the SCS for maritime trade, which is essential for the global economy, the US is naturally concerned by China’s actions in the region and is therefore willing to deepen its ties with riparian states to counter its influence. Vietnam is particularly important, due to its geographic location and because it is among the most powerful countries in the area. During an official trip in 2016, former President Barack Obama lifted the embargo on arms sales to Vietnam; and in March 2018 the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson visited Vietnam. Considering the troubled past between the two countries, these are quite notable developments.

In spite of some positive signs, the trends described above seem to indicate that economic exchanges and diplomatic promises are not enough to prevent tension. Both powers are indeed acting to secure their own national interest, with China reinforcing its positions in the SCS and Vietnam modernizing its military and fostering ties with the US and other countries. In a broader context of US-China competition, it seems that Vietnam will play an increasingly important role; but at the same time, this will put it in a collision course with the PRC, with potentially detrimental consequences for international security and for the regional stability of an area marked by territorial disputes. Only time will tell what will happen, but it seems that Sino-Vietnamese relations will follow a downgrading course in the coming years.

Is China the new tiger of Bangladesh?

Bangladesh and China have maintained good relations for much of history. Today the two countries share a strong strategic relationship, with China playing a vital role mainly in terms of economic and infrastructure development of Bangladesh. However things weren’t so good especially during the time when Bangladesh gained independence from Pakistan and the subsequent years until around the mid 1970s.

During Bangladesh’s War of Liberation in 1971, there was a outbreak of complex geopolitical rivalries. India had allied with Bangladesh due to their long-term conflicts with Pakistan, and more so because Bangladesh was actually a part of Pakistan after the end of the British empire since 1947. China had been allied with Pakistan for most of history, and the ties strengthened especially around the time of the Sino-Indian war in 1962. As a result China opposed Bangladesh’s independence and vetoed their UN membership until 1974.[1]

It was only after the military coup in Bangladesh in 1975 that relations between Bangladesh and China started to improve. Prime Minister of Bangladesh since their independence, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had close ties with India, and only months after the military takeover, China eventually recognised Bangladesh as an independent state as diplomatic relations were secured.[2] This dramatic transformation was fascinating, but it did not come as a surprise as the military rule led by President Ziaur Rahman distanced Bangladesh from India and the Soviets[3], which can possibly be regarded as one of the most significant reasons for their improved relationships. Ziaur Rahman helped restore free market economy in Bangladesh[4] and made a visit to China in 1977 which is regarded as a crucial step in laying groundwork for bilateral cooperation, which was followed by Chinese visits to Bangladesh in the late 1970s. Since then state visits between the two countries have been regular most of which have resulted in positive discussions and signings of agreements on political, economic and security issues.

Current relations

Bangladesh and China share a very strong relationship that ranges from the spheres of the economy, politics, development to defence and security. Today, Bangladesh considers China an “all-weather friend and a trusted ally”[5]. The cooperation dates back to Bangladesh’s  military rule in the mid-70s, however the democratically elected governments since 1991 have been able to keep up the good relations. In a 2010 visit to Bangladesh by then Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping, he stated that Sino-Bangladesh relations would remain strong regardless of any change in the domestic or international situation.[6] Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on the other hand reiterated the importance of the country’s bilateral relations with China considering them a major ally of the highest significance.[7]

Economic ties

One of the most important aspects of the Sino-Bangla bilateral relations is the economic cooperation. China are by far the largest trading partner of Bangladesh with the latest World Bank figures revealing that Chinese exports to Bangladesh to be worth over US$ 10 billion (in 2015)[8]. On the other hand Bangladesh is China’s third largest trade partner. Majority of Bangladesh’s imports from china consist of raw materials for clothing and textile.[9] However the balance of trade between the countries is significant with Bangladesh having a deficit of approximately US$ 9 billion.[10] Reduction in trade deficit has been a primary concern for Bangladesh over the years, and following negotiations China agreed to provide duty-free access to around 5000 Bangladeshi products to the Chinese market under the Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) which has so far resulted in a slight decline in the ratio of trade deficit[11].

Possible Free Trade Agreement?

Talks have been in progress for several years about Bangladesh seeking a zero-tariff access of 99 percent items including Ready-made garments products in order to improve balance of trade. China’s meteoric rise in becoming the 2nd largest economy in the world only behind the United States by toppling Japan was possible largely due to its diversified economy, while having 14 FTA’s with developed as well as developing countries around the globe.

However there are some challenges of the FTA, mainly with regard to China’s ‘Made in China 2015’ industrial policy plan. There are significant restrictions on investing in China, and also preference is given to state-owned enterprises that control 38 percent of industrial assets in China, skewing competition in the market in favour of those.[12] Also another concern for foreign investors is the ‘Chinese ways’ of implementation and enforcement of laws and regulations which tend to be ambiguous and lax.

A major geopolitical challenge concerning the FTA would come from the United States and India, especially with India also having a strong alliance with Bangladesh. Chances are that India may take the Chinese assertion in its backyard as a means of increasing influence in India’s sphere, while the United States may consider an FTA as a geostrategic obstacle in containing China at the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean region. However, if Bangladesh wants to achieve a fairly unrestricted access to Chinese markets it needs to keep pushing further on the negotiation table, while asserting to their other major allies, India and the United States that the actions are for their own best interests mainly in terms of economic development.

Will the US-China trade war have an impact on Bangladesh?

The recent trade war instigated by Donald Trump with his protectionist approach, with Chinese retaliations following by, has had impacts in the Bangladeshi economy. There has been a rise in steel prices (mainly rods) in the domestic market threatening both the major public infrastructure projects and the real estate market due to the US imposing tariff on US$ 34 billion worth of exports from China, while the latter imposed tariff on American cotton, and while China plan on importing cotton from India, the prices had already increased by 10-12 percent. It must be noted that more than half of Bangladesh’s cotton imports are from India  [13]. Soaring cotton prices would significantly hurt Bangladesh’s economy as they would affect the readymade garment sector.

Despite having strong economic ties there have been disagreements; a significant one is Bangladesh’s refusal of agreeing to China’s terms and conditions for the construction of the Sonadia deep-sea port in 2014.

Defence and Security Cooperation

Defence cooperation has been one of the major strengths in the bilateral relations between the two countries. China happens to be the only country that Bangladesh has signed a defence agreement with, which was done in 2002. Since then China had been the largest supplier of weapons and military equipment to Bangladesh, with latter being the 2nd largest recipient of Chinese arms in the world between 2011 and 2015[14]. Between 2013 and 2017 China has provided Bangladesh with 71 percent of all their arms purchases[15]. Bangladesh also recently purchased their first submarines to add to their naval fleet causing concerns in India. The Bangladeshi armed forces have acquired large numbers of tanks, large-calibre artillery, armoured personnel carriers, small arms and light weapons (SALW) as Chinese arms are the Bangladeshi Army’s weapon of choice while the Navy use Chinese frigates with missiles, missile boats, torpedo boats among others. China have also been supplying fighter jets and training aircraft to the Bangladeshi Air Force since 1977[16].

Very recently China and Bangladesh made crucial developments in security cooperation. The bilateral relations between the two countries have been elevated to ”Strategic Partnership of Cooperation”. The deal is aimed at intelligence sharing and counterterrorism activities, although other important matters such as cybercrime, militancy, transnational crimes, narcotics, fire service, and visa issues were also discussed during the signing of this major agreement[17].

Development cooperation/ Infrastructure development

Development cooperation is an integral part of the bilateral relations between China and Bangladesh. China has played a crucial role in the infrastructure development of Bangladesh over the years. It has assisted Bangladesh in building bridges, roads and railway tracks and power plants. The development assistance from China to Bangladesh and other developing countries mostly come as LOC’s. During a recent Bangladesh visit in 2016, President Xi Jingping promised US$24 billion in economic assistance to Bangladesh mainly as LOCs related to 24 projects[18].

China assisted Bangladesh in the construction of six bridges commonly known as the ““China- Bangladesh Friendship” bridges[19]. China also helped Bangladesh in constructing the Barapukuria coal-fired power plant located in Dinajpur in the North West of Bangladesh and was commissioned in 2006[20]. During Jingpin’s visit to Bangladesh in 2016, the countries signed agreements for two 1320 MW coal-fired power plants- one Payra, Patuakhali and the other in Banshkhali, Chittagong- making China the largest energy partner to Bangladesh overtaking India[21].

China has also provided economic assistance to Bangladesh in terms of free aid and token gifts. Two major agreements were signed in 2010 for establishing a fertiliser factory, and telecommunications network systems in Bangladesh- that were to be set up with a US$ 770 million LOC from China with a two percent interest rate payable within 20 years[22]. There had been discussions for several years on potential road and railway connections linking Chittagong with Kunming that would boost the economies of both the countries however that has not materialised as of yet[23]. Currently China is developing a 750-acre industrial park in Chittagong which will take five years to become fully operational and it will largely be used by Chinese manufacturing firms[24].

Conclusion

The good relations shared between China and Bangladesh have always been of mutual interests and both countries benefit from that. Although the growing relations between China and Bangladesh raise geopolitical tensions in the South Asia region and the Bay of Bengal, there should not be much doubt that China’s primary interest lies in the booming economy of Bangladesh, which has been ever so dependent on their bilateral trade relations. Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has recently said that there is nothing to be concerned about for India while not explicitly mentioning China or any other country, and that Bangladesh need funds for the sole purpose of development and that she would welcome any country that is willing to invest in the country; she also urged India to maintain cordial relationship with all its neighbours[25]. Keeping close ties with Bangladesh will no doubt be hugely beneficial for China as the demand for oil and gas have risen largely owing to its growing industries, and having a strong geopolitical presence in the Bay of Bengal and the littoral countries could give them an advantage in terms of accessibility to various ports. On the other hand Bangladesh can only benefit from the cooperation with a major economic power as it has done so in terms of their diplomatic, economic and security affairs and would be keenly anticipating further developments in their bilateral cooperation.

[1] http://countrystudies.us/bangladesh/108.htm

[2] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320546820_SINO-BANGLADESH_RELATIONS_AN_APPRAISAL

[3] http://countrystudies.us/bangladesh/108.htm

[4] http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/489960-1338997241035/Growth_Commission_Working_Paper_22_Economic_Reforms_Growth_Governance_Political_Economy_Aspects_Bangladesh_Development_Surprise.pdf

[5] https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/41935-decoding-china-bangladesh-relationship/

[6] Xinhua, 16 June 2010.

[7] “China pledges free market access”, The Daily Star, 19 March 2010.

[8] https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/BGD

[9] https://www.thedailystar.net/op-ed/politics/expanding-the-bangladesh-china-trade-frontier-1296583

[10] https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/41935-decoding-china-bangladesh-relationship/

[11] https://www.thedailystar.net/op-ed/politics/expanding-the-bangladesh-china-trade-frontier-1296583

[12] https://www.dhakatribune.com/opinion/op-ed/2018/05/18/free-trade-agreement-with-china-a-necessity

[13] https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/more-just-facts/what-does-the-us-china-trade-war-mean-bangladesh-1604986

[14] https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/why-chinas-submarine-deal-with-bangladesh-matters/

[15] https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/fssipri_at2017_0.pdf

[16] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320546820_SINO-BANGLADESH_RELATIONS_AN_APPRAISAL

[17] https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/nation/2018/10/26/bangladesh-china-sign-3-agreements-on-security-cooperation

[18] https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/41935-decoding-china-bangladesh-relationship/

[19] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320546820_SINO-BANGLADESH_RELATIONS_AN_APPRAISAL

[20] https://china.aiddata.org/projects/33957

[21] https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/2016/10/18/china-becomes-bangladeshs-largest-energy-partner/

[22] Rezaul Karim Byron, “$ 770 million Chinese loan tied with conditions”, The Daily Star, 28 September 2010.

[23] https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-259521

[24] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bagnladesh-china/china-to-develop-bangladesh-industrial-zone-as-part-of-south-asia-push-idUSKCN1HB1M2

[25] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-need-not-worry-about-bangladesh-china-ties-sheikh-hasina/articleshow/63037906.cms

What is the role of Italy in Europe?

Italy is facing a delicate political and economic situation. Once a centre of the Western Civilization, it gradually lost its centrality throughout the centuries. More recently, it plunged in a severe recession following the global financial crisis, and it has shown signs of recovery only in the past few years. Yet, it remains the Eurozone’s third largest economy and fourth in the EU as a whole, and it remains one of the most influential countries in the Union, of which it has been a supporter for decades. However, the current coalition government formed by the Five Star Movement and the League is casting doubts over Italy’s commitment to the EU, and notably over its budgetary rules. This in turn raises concerns over its own economic recovery and also on the tenure of the EU as a whole, which is caught between two diverging views of European integration.

Italy’s contribution to the Western Civilisation

The Italian Peninsula was first unifed under a single political entity by the Romans, whose legions ultimately conquered a vast Empire centred on Italia. But after a long decline, it ultimately fell during the 5th century AD. Yet, it left an immense cultural heritage, itself a product of the contacts with conquered peoples, first and foremost the Greeks; without which modern-day Western civilization would not be the same.

But after the demise of the Roman Empire, Italy has been divided for centuries. Yet, it continued having a huge influence over Europe in cultural, economic and also political terms. The Italian Maritime Republics played a pivotal role in trade, and following the Crusaded they established outposts in the Outremer that became one of the main vehicles of contact with the more advanced Islamic world. Italy was also an important manufacturing centre, and modern finance finds its roots in its economic activities, notably those of Venice and Florence. This, of course, had a political spillover. The Fourth Crusade, which ended with the occupation of Constantinople for nearly sixty years, was largely driven by Venice’s economic interests. A family of businessmen, the Medici, managed to transform their wealth in political influence and took power in Florence. Italy’s northern cities played a central role in the long struggle between the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire, and their quest for autonomy kept the latter busy for decades. As a result of this economic prosperity, culture flourished: be it in literature, art, philosophy or other fields. In Europe, only the cities in the Flanders and those of the Hanseatic League could rival the Italians. As for the South, it was the setting of intense cultural interchanges, especially with the Byzantines and the Arabs; which made of Sicily a major cultural centre that, along with Spain, allowed the reintroduction in Europe of many Classical works that had been forgotten. All this gave a fundamental contribution to the period of cultural and economic revival known as the Renaissance; which left an immense heritage to today’s Europe.

Yet, Italy was politically divided. Various city-states rose and fall, but none of them could become powerful enough to unify all the land, as others always formed a coalition to block its expansion; often with the aid of foreign powers that frequently invaded the Peninsula. Starting from the XVII century, its economic and cultural prominence also started declining in favour of the rising nation-states like France, Spain and England.

Reunification & World Wars

After centuries of division, Italy was finally unified in the 19th century following a long process known as Risorgimento. Under the able statesmanship of Cavour, the Kingdom of Sardinia (whose centre was actually in Piedmont) managed to unify most of the Peninsula; thus proclaiming the Kingdom of Italy in 1861. The new state soon started a modernization process that marked its rise among Europe’s main powers; even though it never got close to France, Britain, Germany or Russia. Its industry developed, and with it the military. With time, it also managed to gain some colonies in Africa.

Italy fought alongside the Allies in WWI, and was among the victorious powers. But right after the conflict, Italy found itself in a troubled economic situation due to the huge costs of the war. In the early 20s, the country was in social turmoil. The socialists and the recently-created Communist Party were gaining influence; resulting in mass demonstrations during the “Red Biennium” of 1919-1920. Fearing a revolution, the government attempted to exploit another movement to counter the left’s rise: the Fascists led by Benito Mussolini. However, the situation soon went out of control. In 1922, the Fascists marched in arms on Rome; and with a decision that would later cause much debate, the King appointed Mussolini as head of the government to avoid a civil war. Soon, Mussolini dismantled the democratic order and established a dictatorship. Its legacy is highly controversial, notably as it ended up allying with Nazi Germany and collaborating with it during the Holocaust; but in terms of power politics Mussolini managed to extend Italy’s territory, to strengthen its armed forces and to make of Italy one of the main players in the international politics of the time. Yet, as before, the country remained globally weaker when compared to other powers.

Yet, the overall balance of the fascist regime is definitely negative. In 1940 it brought Italy in a conflict it was unprepared for and which ended up in a catastrophic defeat. Additionally, since September 1943 Italy was split in two: the south, liberated by the Allies, joined them in the war against Germany; while the north and centre of the country became a puppet state controlled by the Nazis. This resulted in a civil war; not only between the two states, but also between the partisans on one side and Fascist supporters plus the German troops on the other. This conflict left a deep mark on post-war Italy and on its national identity.

Italy after WWII 

When WWII ended, Italy was in ruins. After a complex political process, it became a Republic in 1946 and adopted a new Constitution two years later. Like Germany and Japan, this also included provisions meant to avoid that the country may undertake once again an expansionist policy; but it was still authorized to have its own armed forces for strictly defensive purposes. The Christian Democracy became the party around which Italian governments would be formed for the decades to come. In foreign policy, Italy joined NATO in 1949 and the European integration process in 1951. But in spite of its alignment with Western powers, the Communist Party was very strong, and it remained the main opposition force until the 90s. In economic terms, Italy soon experienced an extraordinary GDP growth: during the 50s, its size grew of almost 6% per year on average, and this figure was constantly higher in the five years between 1958 and 1963. This expansion was equal or superior to that of most European countries, and it completely transformed Italy by making of it one of the continent’s main economies. The factors behind the “economic miracle” are multiple; and include the large and cheap labour force, foreign aid received via the Marshall Plan and the advantages of economic integration with fellow Western European countries.

Yet, with time this growth slowed down, and Italy was surpassed by other economies. Again, there are multiple reasons. The oil shocks in the 70s hit the country, as it was (and remains) dependent on energy imports. But Italy also lost its competitive advantage as salaries and costs grew. To counter this, the governments used to devaluate the lira to make exports cheaper; but this was just a short-term and ineffective solution, because it soon caused inflation which in turn had detrimental effects on competitiveness and on foreign debt. In the end, also in the optic of adopting the Euro, starting from 1987 Italy decided to respect the communitarian monetary rules and stabilize the Lira, thus ending decades of devaluation-inflation cycles to appreciate the currency, reduce inflation and converge with other countries. But a series of factors caused a crisis of the Lira in 1992, which resulted in a severe devaluation. Still, after implementing corrective measures, the path towards adopting the Euro continued. Italy tried to align its macro-economic parameters with those of fellow countries and to respect the rules on debt and public deficit. So, in spite of the scepticism of other states (notably Germany) and of not respecting completely the convergence criteria, Italy was allowed to adopt the Euro in 2002.

In the meanwhile, significant changes also occurred in international and domestic politics. Right after the dissolution of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, the Italian Communist Party was dismantled. But the Christian Democracy was also fundamentally shaken by a series of investigation on corruption, and it disappeared as well. The political order that had lasted since the late 40s was over, and even though the Constitution was not modified, this marked the passage to the “Second Republic”. In the new context, media magnate Silvio Berlusconi rapidly became a prominent politician by exploiting his wealth and the very media he owned. Another emerging political force was the North League: evoking the struggle of the northern cities against the Empire during the Middle Ages, it advocated for secession of the rich regions of the north or at least for more autonomy. Yet, Italy continued to experience political fragmentation and frequent changes of government.

In 2011, the country was shaken by the debt crisis that had begun in Greece, itself a consequence of the US financial crisis of 2008. The government in charge resigned and was substituted by a “Government of Experts” chaired by economist Mario Monti, who soon adopted austerity measures to restore financial stability. Still, the economic recovery was sluggish. This, combined with the immigration crisis, finally led to the victory of two populist and Eurosceptic parties in the 2018 elections, namely the Five Star Movement and the League (which had unofficially dropped the label “North” in an attempt to become a nation-wide party). After a long deadlock, they formed a coalition government whose orientations have created concerns in Brussels, especially over economic policy.

Italy and the EU

The Italian government has recently presented a budgetary manoeuver that is considered too risky by the EU, and this has led to a vivid political skirmish between the two sides.

The Italian executive wants to implement expansionary policies to boost domestic consumption and consequently economic growth. These include tax cuts and a much-debated basic income for the lower classes. But this would bring the public deficit to 2.4% of the GDP; which, even though it does not exceed the legal gap of 3%, is considered too high by the EU. As a matter of fact, the Commission fears that the stimulus will not be sufficient to foster growth and that the only result would be to put further strain on Italy’s public debt, which is already at almost 132% of GDP against a limit of 60% demanded by EU rules; thus damaging its financial credibility and nullifying the progress it has struggled to make in a decade of austerity. But the Italian government has rejected the requests to modify the budgetary manoeuver, on the basis that it is up to Italians to decide and that they are not compelled to respect the demands of EU institutions, often portrayed as a diktat in the executive’s discourse. Italy has also found some international support, notably from US President Donald Trump, who in August had offered to buy Italian bonds. While it is legally possible, considering that Italy is now challenging the EU, the Union’s institutions may perceive this as an unnecessary intromission.

Assessing what will happen to Italy is hard, but the government’s economic policy does present some risks that may harm the country’s growth, which may result in new EU-backed austerity measures. But the greater danger is political: if the feud continues escalating, unpredictability will damage both parties and in the worse scenario may even lead to Italy’s exit from the EU, which would be another severe blow to the European integration project in a moment where Brexit is also unfolding along with vivid discussions between the Visegrad countries and the EU institutions. As we examined in another video, this divergence over the nature and the powers of the EU is the kind of “civil war” that may ultimately threaten its tenure, with unpredictable economic and political consequences.

The Geopolitics of the Bay of Bengal

The Bay of Bengal is located in the North-East region of the Indian Ocean, and is bounded by Bangladesh to the North, Myanmar and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands of India to the East, India and Sri Lanka to the West. Some of the major sea ports in the Bay of Bengal include Chennai, Kolkata and Visakhapatnam in India and the port of Chittagong in Bangladesh making the region (of the Bay) a crucial economic hub. With an area of 2,173,000 square kilometres, the Bay of Bengal is the largest Bay in the world which is at the forefront of Asia’s experience of climate change[1]. Over the years the significance Bay of Bengal have been on the rise largely owing to the rapid economic growth of the littoral nations and the major powers involved in the bay.[2]

Brief History

Throughout the medieval, early modern and modern periods of world history from the indigenous city-states as well as empires, later to the British Empire the Bay of Bengal had been a singular civilisation united by a rice culture and common coastline that kept bringing trade and migrants along its shores.[3] Historically the Bay of Bengal has played a significant role of a connector- where trade, commerce and culture were intertwined for centuries. However in the early 20th century the British Empire used the Bay of Bengal for trade and other related activities, causing a significant increase in shipping between British India and British Burma. Yangon (Burmese Capital) was fascinatingly turned into one of the busiest ports in the world for migrant arrivals alongside the likes of New York; with majority of the flow from India towards Burma (now known as Myanmar)[4]. Strong ties between Burma and India developed as a direct consequence of the migration, which followed a downward curve in the years following the partition of India in 1947 and the Burmese independence in 1948 from Japanese occupation since world war II.[5]

Economic and Security issues

Bay of Bengal is rapidly becoming an area of key economic and strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. A crucial geopolitical development was the creation of a regional body- the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) between Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand- which seeks to promote regional cooperation and engagement in the area particularly between the two major geopolitical blocs of the region- the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). However BIMSTEC’s focus is solely economic with their main objective being supporting free trade hence it does little to provide any support in terms of maritime security issues that have particularly grown in recent years with respect to Chinese and Indian interests.[6]

Crucial geopolitical factors concerning the Bay of Bengal

China’s economic and security interests over the past few decades have resulted in greater Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. China has been successful in developing strong economic relations with major Bay of Bengal countries such as Bangladesh and Myanmar primarily through infrastructure development projects that include pipelines, roads and railway, port-development and power-plant construction.[7] Key strategists from India expressed concerns over the rising Chinese influence in the outposts of the Indian Ocean which they fear could enable China to turn them into military bases encircling India.[8] Although it is argued that China’s interests are more economic in terms of ease of connecting to the other parts of the world on their West, it has not stopped India from taking precautionary steps by making rapid developments in modernising their naval capabilities as well as developing multilateral and bilateral naval ties with key players of the Bay of Bengal.

China-India relations in the Bay of Bengal

China and India are playing a strategic and economic tug-of-war in Myanmar among other littoral nations along the Bay of Bengal. China has recently assisted in building key ports in Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka and according to recent reports it is funding the development of the Chittagong port of Bangladesh, while having reached an multi-billion dollar agreement to build a major deep sea port in Kyaukpyu, Myanmar on the coast of the Bay of Bengal.[9] China already have a significant presence in Myanmar with the gas pipeline connecting China’s Yunnan Province with Myanmar’s major Rakhine state already in operation and a parallel oil pipeline that is supposed to soon begin operations.[10] Since the launch of India’s Look East Policy in the 1990s it has strengthened its political, economic and strategic ties with South East Asian countries and beyond [11], with more actions being considered in order to have leverage over China. It is safe to say that while India had other priorities such as the inward economic orientation and preoccupation with troubled land borders mainly in the North and the North West, it was the growing influence of China’s maritime influence that prompted India’s strategic interests in the Bay of Bengal through its Look East Policy.[12] India and China are locked into this strategic competition for naval dominance as well as influence in the Indian Ocean’s littoral states and it can be argued that China might just have the edge due to its closer connections to some of the major littorals- i.e. Bangladesh and Myanmar.

The island nation of Sri Lanka also has strong economic ties with both India and China, with a growing regional and security cooperation with the former. However the recent takeover of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port by China has had significant impacts- one of which is lessening the country’s debts to China, who has made a lot of investments in Sri Lanka over the years.[13]

Maritime disputes


Bangladesh, India and Myanmar have had their fair share of disputes regarding maritime territories. One of the most recent disputes was between Bangladesh and Myanmar as tensions were building when South Korea’s Daewoo began natural gas exploration for Myanmar in what Bangladesh claimed was their waters, prompting Bangladesh to submit a continental shelf claim to the United Nations’ Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Largely owing to Myanmar’s conflicting claims, the events led up to the mobilisation of naval forces along the disputed area although eventually a conflict was avoided.[14] The disputes were largely settled by the International Tribunal for the Land of the Seas (ITLOS) in 2012 and 2014 respectively.[15]

Myanmar relations with the littoral nations

Myanmar is regarded as a key player in the strategic equation along the Northern region of the Bay of Bengal that is fiercely contested by China and India. Myanmar have seen growing economic ties with India since the World War II while China have also been developing ties through various means primarily comprising infrastructure support.  Myanmar signed its first bilateral trade deal with India in 1970 and has been gradually increasing in volume since. According to some of the latest figures available, Indian exports to Myanmar totalled US$1.1 billion (1111.19 million) in the FY 2016-17 while imports were worth US$ 1 billion (1067.25 million), making it the fifth largest trade partner with Myanmar, despite trade said to remain below potential.[16] On the other hand Bangladesh and Myanmar established diplomatic ties in 1972 which resulted in progressing bilateral relations in the subsequent years. However in the mid-seventies as President Thein Sein’s government transformed Myanmar’s military government into a quasi-civilian government the bilateral relations never realised their full potential.[17] The end of their military rule in 2011 brought about a new glimmer of hope, however the recent Rohingya crisis has hindered any progress as Bangladesh are hosting a million refugees and have constantly failed in their repatriation due to the Bangladeshi government failing to have reached an agreement with the Myanmar government led by Aung (San) Suu Kyi.

Security/strategic issues

China are the largest trade partners to both Bangladesh and Myanmar and is also the biggest supplier of conventional arms to both the countries. Bangladesh had recently purchased two submarines from China to bolster its naval forces causing tensions in India, with Indian analysts claiming it “greatly enhances the mistrust between Delhi and Dhaka”.[18]

While most of the issues were regarding the littoral nations and China, major actors such as Japan, alongside China have significant interest in the Bay of Bengal, as they access it through the Malacca Strait for the purpose of trade in goods and energy.[19] One of the most significant reasons for China’s growing presence is to find reliable oil supplies and secure unencumbered SLOCs.

India on the other hand had been working towards a “Bay of Bengal community” envisaging greater security cooperation with the littoral nations.[20] It is obvious that other actors play a significant role however the Bay of Bengal does have significance for India’s own best interests as well as data from 2013 reveals that 95 percent of India’s foreign trade by volume and 75 percent by value were conducted by sea.[21] The economic growth also led to India’s expansion of its Navy as it claims is for the safety of the Ocean’s SLOCs regarding it a critical move to support and protect for themselves and for the global community.[22]

Other challenges to stability

There is little doubt about the significance of the Bay of Bengal to the Asia’s rising powers however there are some challenges especially for its low-lying littorals. Currently, the Bay is being reshaped by population growth, climate change, overexploitation of fisheries, degradation of critical habitats, pollution, and deteriorating water quality and it is getting increasingly clear that multilateral cooperation is vital for the littorals, especially important is that they keep aside their political differences to work together while maintaining a healthy competition. Currently there is already an initiative known as the Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem (BOBLME) Project designed to improve the lives of the coastal populations through improved regional management of the Bay of Bengal environment and its fisheries, and countries that are involved are as follows- Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand.[23]

What’s Next

The geopolitics surrounding the Bay of Bengal is probably one of the most complex issues in the continent if not the world, with the region comprising a diverse range of social, economic and political factors. However there is little doubt that the key actors involved with the Bay of Bengal all have a crucial role to play in the progress of the region and for themselves in relation to prospects of regional strategic security and economic cooperation and transformation of the (developing) nations.

 

[1] http://blogs.bbk.ac.uk/research/2014/01/27/the-bay-of-bengal-in-global-history/

[2] https://hrcak.srce.hr/135023

[3] https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/critical-bay-bengal

[4] King’s College Discussion. “The Bay of Bengal: Rise and Decline of a South Asian Region”. YouTube.

[5] https://www.mea.gov.in/images/pdf/Indian-Migrants-Myanmar.pdf ; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33973982

[6] https://southasianvoices.org/bay-of-bengal-indias-centerpiece-springboard/

[7] https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IRP-2012-U-002319-Final.pdf

[8] https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IRP-2012-U-002319-Final.pdf

[9] https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/china-myanmar-ink-deal-for-port-on-bay-of-bengal-third-in-india-s-vicinity/story-Lbm4IwOMuqrNvXGv4ewuYJ.html ; https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/china-to-build-port-in-myanmar-third-in-indias-neighbourhood-1944916

[10]

[11] http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/indien/11043.pdf

[12] https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/chinese-takeaway-bengals-bay/

[13] https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/navy-league/2018/04/09/sri-lanka-cedes-major-port-to-china-fueling-tensions/

[14] https://amti.csis.org/the-bangladeshmyanmar-maritime-dispute-lessons-for-peaceful-resolution/

[15] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RskGT2pUiIY

[16] https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/MYANMAR_August_2017_new.pdf

[17] https://www.myanmarisis.org/publication_pdf/final-version-myanmar-bangladesh-relations-mmedits-ah2-1wpFhW.pdf

[18] https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/why-chinas-submarine-deal-with-bangladesh-matters/

[19] https://hrcak.srce.hr/135023

[20] https://www.deccanherald.com/national/india-wants-bay-bengal-be-688774.html

[21] Hughes, L., 2014. Examining the Sino-Indian Maritime Competition: Part 4 – India’s Maritime Strategy. Future Directions International. [online] January 30 2014. Available at: http://www.futuredirections.org. au/publications/indian-ocean/1516-examining-the-sino-indian- maritime-competition-part-4-india-s-maritime-strategy.html

[22] https://hrcak.srce.hr/135023

[23] https://hrcak.srce.hr/135023

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