Recently France has been swayed by large scale protests carried out by tens of thousands of its citizens in response to a series of economic reforms since the new government came to power in 2017. A growing mistrust amid the tax cuts on corporations and high earners while raising taxes for the working class has prompted the people to put pressure on the government to make big changes.
Emmanuel Macron founded the centrist movement named “En Marche!” in April 2016 and much to the surprise of many, won the elections the following year. The French saw promise in Macron’s manifesto, which promised significant economic reforms backed up by his relevant experiences both in the public and private sectors. The fragile economy and mistrust for the previous regime left the people with no options but to take a risk instead of voting far-right candidate Marine Le Pen. However as the recent “Yellow Vests” movement spread out in France the truths behind the reforms have only started to get publicity.
Francois Hollande, who preceded Macron as President, failed to live up to expectations having faced major opposition from his proposed economic and employment reforms. He faced criticism for many issues including failing to address difficulties in integrating immigrants into the French society and even pandering to the right with his comments on stripping French citizens with dual nationalities off their citizenship following the high profile terrorist attacks that shook the country, including the Charlie Hebdo shooting in 2015 and the Nice truck attack in 2016. Hollande decided not to re-run for the election due to a combination of social, political and economic frailties and the huge mistrust shared among the French citizens. Macron on the other hand was appointed Deputy Secretary General to Hollande in 2012, while also serving as Minister of Economy, Industry and Digital Affairs between 2014 and 2016, where he formulated several business reforms to aid the economy.
Macron was born in Amiens, France and is an alumnus of the elite École Nationale d’Administration. He showed great aptitude in the areas of literature, politics and theatre at an early age and had been able to forge powerful connections during his time as an inspector at the French Finance Ministry during Nicolas Sarkozy’s tenure as President. However he switched civil service to work in investment banking at Rothchilde and Co where he swiftly rose up the ranks to become managing director before being appointed as Francois Hollande’s staff.  His most significant contribution in investment banking was his crucial role in advising Nestlé on its USD 12 billion acquisition of a unit of Pfizer in 2012 which earned the nickname- “the Mozart of finance”.
Despite public protests as, the business reform package he introduced in 2015 as Finance Minister was forced through parliament by then Prime Minister Manuel Valls who invoked the special article 49.3 procedure which also received criticism from within the ruling Socialist party. However he soon resigned (in 2016), and founded En Marche! And announced his candidacy for the 2017 presidential election. His manifesto attracted a lot of attention, and was even able to gain support from both the left and the right, especially through his proposals that aimed at lowering housing and corporate taxes, reforming pensions and welfare, and allocating substantial resources.
He became France’s youngest ever president by defeating Le Pen in 2017. He had received 66.1 percent of the 47 million votes cast. He had never held an elected post but it did not seem very difficult for him to achieve his objective.
Plans for the economy/budget:
The biggest test, and also Macron’s main objective has been to overhaul France’s economy. He inherited a very poorly performing economy from his predecessor with the biggest challenges being:
His twin aims are to boost investment and set up a “new growth model” that is both good for social mobility and the environment. Macron has been advocating a Nordic-style economic model that mixes spending cuts of 60 billion euros with a 50 billion euro stimulus package over the same period. The “spend and save” system that Macron plans is meant to mix targeted public spending with fiscal discipline as a Nordic model. Besides lowering corporate tax rate from 33 to 25 percent he also has plans to slash 120,000 jobs from France’s bloated civil service while lowering companies and households; tax bill by 20 billion euros. These are part of the major economic reforms that Macron has planned while making France stick to the EU government deficit limit of 3 percent of GDP.
Security and Defence
In light of the recent terrorist attacks that have rattled France and resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives, Macron has proposed increase in defence and policing by recruiting 10,000 new police officers and expand prison capacities. He also advocates the idea of an EU army, and has been promoting joint military projects and setting up a permanent European headquarters.
Some of his notable plans for governance includes reducing number of lawmakers by a third in both the Senate and National Assembly, banning the hiring of family-members as assistants of lawmakers, and banning consulting activity for people holding elected office.
Foreign relations and others
France’s commitment to 2015 Paris climate agreement has been among the key global issues that Macron has promised to back-up and promote since his early days in the office.
When it comes to foreign relations he has voiced support for multilateral institutions such as the UN security council, however also supporting the promotion of the French language and Francophone institutions as “an essential vector of our influence and a weapon against the spread of radicalism”. He stands strong against the Syrian regime led by Bashar al Assad and wants him to answer for his crimes before an international tribunal while being a strong critic of Russian policy, backing EU sanctions following the Ukraine crisis.
Macron is pro-EU and has campaigned for greater cooperation and integration within the EU on fiscal, environmental and social regulation. In his European agenda he has expressed his plans towards a common fiscal policy, a joint finance minister, implementation of the banking union and a bolstered bilateral relations with Germany.
Macron’s tenure as president
Macron came to power at a problematic time- he faced a massive restructuring of regional powers following the Brexit referendum, as well as US President Donald Trump’s reshuffling of American interests. These major changes made the situation a little more difficult from the very start, and especially after the shocking withdrawal of the US from the Paris climate accord, a decision made my Trump himself, who does not believe in climate change. This prompted Macron to offer France as a second homeland to climate researchers.
One of the first things he did was making a state visit immediately after his election to meet Angela Merkel in his quest for improved Franco-German relations and since forged a strong relationship with Merkel and agreed on a “common roadmap” for Europe. However Merkel has a more cautious approach than Macron when it comes to major issues concerning the EU.
He has always been vocal about increased European cooperation on many issues, and has been pushing for a “European Army” to improve security in the EU-with Merkel quick to endorse Macron’s plan, and . Macron also voiced strong interests to pursue security dialogue with Russia seeking to improve EU-Russia relations especially in terms of security.
Macron had been quick in pressing for reforms soon as he took charge- with one of his first significant contributions being against mass corruption and nepotism in French politics- introducing a ban on elected representative from hiring family members.
Yellow vests movement
In the May 2018, a political movement arose that challenged Macron’s economic reforms. It has been named “Mouvement des gilets jaunes” or the “Yellow Vests Movement” where demonstrations started on 17 November 2018, months after it was created. The main protagonists of the now ongoing movement are the ordinary working and middle class French citizens who strongly feel that Macron is not the leader for the ordinary working class. What triggered the movement was the proposal to keep increasing a direct tax on fuel, as well as the carbon tax. Although Macron stated that these were part of his plans to reduce fossil fuel reliance but it has been widely criticised as an act of “taxing the poor to tackle climate change”.
In his first budget Macron’s business friendly government had proposed trimming corporate rates and a “wealth tax” on the rich, explaining that boosting investment will aid the economy, however also increasing certain taxes such as one on low-income pensioners. While giving tax breaks to big corporations, plans of charging lower taxes on high-paid workers in certain industries have garnered mistrust from ordinary citizens and political rivals alike, with the left-wing calling him “Hero to the rich”. He also moved to loosen hiring and firing regulations on companies to improve France’s paralysed labour market.
Protests have been going on for over a month and hundreds of thousands of French citizens have taken part in what seems to be an anti-Macron rebellion, with the premier making a U-turn by suspending the proposed tax hike amid the protests that have turned violent. French authorities have deployed nearly a hundred thousand security forces during several days of protests detaining thousands and using anti-riot weapons such as tear gas against protestors.
In a very recent bid to end the standoff, Macron announced a package of measures for low-income workers estimated by economists to cost up to 15 billion euros. Besides suspending the fuel-tax hike plans for six months, he also announced raising the minimum wage by a 100 euros per month from 2019 while scrapping the recent increase in social security taxes on pensioners earning less than 2000 euros.
The protests are still ongoing with protestors expecting their 42 directives to be accepted. However recently it has garnered criticism for a lack of leader and organisation, and violence by protestors and use of force by police has already resulted in over 500 injuries. Despite Macron announcing several major changes bowing down to protestors, there are many demands to yet to be met and it is not clear when or how the Yellow Vests Movement will end.
Macron, poised to become “Europe’s next leader” as Merkel nears her exit from politics, saw a major slump in his popularity since the protests. Falling out of favour may mean nationalists such as Marine Le Pen gaining support, and with the rise of the populism in Europe in the past few years, it may not come as a surprise if France leans towards the far-right. A major shift in powers may make the situation in the region volatile and with France being a major power in the EU, and with the UK poised to officially leave the EU in a few months, it would cause a major restructuring in regional powers and interests. Most concerning of all, with countries such as Italy, Hungary and Poland having already given in to populism, a major power joining their ranks will shake up the EU and prove to be a major challenge in the future of the EU. The current situation and its developments in France will have a significant impact on the economic and political stability in the rest of Europe.
 Revault d’Allonnes, David (17 February 2015). “Loi Macron : comment le 49-3 a été dégainé comme un dernier recours”
 “Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel pledge to draw up ‘common road map’ for Europe”. The Telegraph. 15 May 2017
 “France bans hiring of spouses by politicians in wake of Fillon scandal”. Reuters. 27 July 2017.
In an era of mounting rivalry between great powers, and with the Trump administration raising doubts over the America’s commitment to protect Europe, the recent declarations by French President Emmanuel Macron over the need of a “European Army” to protect the continent against Russia, China and even the United States have caused much political debate. But will there ever be a European Union Army?
The debate over the establishment of a European common policy on defence and therefore over the creation of a unified armed force is as old as the European integration process itself. The first step in this sense was came with the Brussels Treaty of 1948 which established the Western Union, an alliance that included the United Kingdom, France and the three Benelux countries. Knowing that their military forces would be insufficient to defend the continent from a Soviet invasion, one year later these and other countries (including the United States) formed NATO, which soon became the main collective defence pact in Europe. Still, the European countries wanted to increase their cooperation in defence in order not to be completely reliant on America. In 1952, France, Italy, West Germany and the three Benelux states signed a treaty to form the European Defence Community. This was an ambitious project that was supposed to create a unified European Army. However, it ended in a failure: the French Parliament did not ratify the Treaty and consequently it never entered into force; which is quite notable considering that today France’s Macron is calling for a common military structure. At that point, the European countries opted for a revision of the Western Union. In 1954 its founding Treaty was modified, transforming the organization into the Western European Union, which included the original members plus Italy and West Germany. This was essentially a political-military mutual defence pact, and did not include any plans for a common armed force. The WEU continued existing as a separate organization until 2011, when it was finally dismantled.
All these initiatives ran in parallel to the European integration process that would later create the EU, which back then was simply the European Coal and Steel Community and therefore had a primarily economic connotation. In 1957, its scope was enlarged and it became the European Economic Community (EEC), whose aim remained essentially that of creating a common market as a premise to greater political cooperation, but which had practically no military ambitions. But various international crises raised the need to at least coordinate the foreign policy actions of its member states. Because of this, the European Political Cooperation was launched in 1970. Yet, it was merely a mechanism to attempt coordinating the positions of members states on foreign policy issues. It did not devolve specific competences to communitarian institutions, did not oblige member states to comply with the decisions that were taken (provided a common agreement was reached) and had essentially no military content. After a series of other international crises in the late 70s and early 80s, the EPC was gradually improved and was finally renamed as Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that transformed the EEC into the European Union. The CFSP was one of the three pillars of the Treaty, something that signalled the willingness to do more on foreign affairs but also, and quite notably, on defence issues. As a matter of fact, the CFSP included the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), that was conceived as the crisis management component of the CFSP. Later, the ESDP was transformed into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009.
However, the name “Common Foreign and Security Policy” is highly misleading, as seems to imply that such issues are treated via the communitarian procedures and therefore that member states devolved at least part of these core sovereign competences to the EU institutions; as it is the case with trade or agricultural policies. In reality, it is exactly the opposite: the CFSP remains under the intergovernmental procedure, so security and defence are still competences of single member states. As the EPC before it, the CFSP is essentially a mechanism to coordinate the action of EU members in security and defence issues.
Even though defence remain a competence of member states, and in spite of the fact that the EU is and wants to appear essentially a civil power, this does not mean that it has not its own military means. In particular, in the framework of the CSDP, the Union can deploy troops under its mandate for accomplishing the so-called “Petersberg Tasks”, established by the now-extinct Western European Union in 1992 and integrated in the EU’s juridical body since the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. These missions are essentially humanitarian aid, peacekeeping and crisis management, which includes peace enforcement. The decision-making procedure is based upon four bodies. The first is the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), whose task is to monitor international crises, evaluate the situation, raise the alert, plan operations according to the Petersberg Tasks, and in general to provide military expertise. On the basis of its assessments, a second organ (the European Union Military Committee, EUMC) advises the Political and Security Committee (PSC); which in turn advances its proposals for EU military actions that are ultimately approved by the member states via the Foreign Affairs Council, a particular formation of the EU Council. As of today, the EU has launched a series of missions abroad; notably in Africa, the Balkans, Ukraine, Georgia, Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of these had a military nature and were meant to provide either peacekeeping or training; whereas the others were civilian operations.
The broader strategic vision upon which the whole of the CFSP is based (therefore including military operations in the CSDP framework) is defined by the European Security Strategy, whose first version was released in 2003 and that has been updated and enlarged twice in 2008 and finally in 2016. As a matter of fact, it is possible to note an evolution in scope through time. The 2003 paper was rather vague and simply presented the EU’s view on the world and its main threats (notably terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction). The 2008 version was essentially an update of the previous: it included more issues, notably energy security, but remains a declaration of objectives rather than a proper strategy. The latest document is the most complete one. It describes the challenges that the EU is facing in various domains and regions, notably in the Middle East and Africa but also in trans-Atlantic relations, in Asia and in regards to Russia. It also declares the EU’s objectives: to promote security, stability, prosperity, state resilience and the rule of law. A notable point to note is that it states that Europeans should take the responsibility to defend themselves and that they should be ready to deter external threats; adding that in NATO’s framework they must become more capable of participating to collective self-defence but also – and this is the most interesting part – to act autonomously if necessary.
This raises the issue of the coordination between the EU and NATO on security. By now, the matter is regulated by the so-called “Berlin Plus Agreement”, which can be summed up by the “Three Ds”: no discrimination, no decoupling and no duplication. In practice, they mean that both the EU and NATO can perform peacekeeping and crisis management operations, that non-EU states can participate to missions managed by the Union, and that if one of the two organizations intervenes the other will restrain from doing so. The EUMC ensures the military coordination between NATO and the EU. However, the Berlin Plus arrangements only regulate the interventions that fall in the scope of the Petersberg Tasks, as in spite of the declaration that Europeans must be able to act on their own that appeared in the 2016 EU Strategy, by now collective self-defence remains a prerogative of NATO, and the EU has neither the juridical powers nor the practical means for this.
Yet, the EU has its own military units: the EU Battlegroups. Established in 2005, the first of them became operational two years later, but have still not seen any actual action. The Battlegroups are multinational battalion-size units established at the EU level; in contrast to multinational forces created by member states outside of the EU framework but that can still be deployed for EU missions as well as for those of other organizations. The Battlegroups’ composition varies, but normally they consist of around 1,500 infantrymen plus support personnel. They are under the political control of the Council, while operational command goes to the “leading country” that gives the main contribution to the Battlegroup in terms of personnel and equipment. Non-EU countries can also participate. Today, a total of 18 Battlegroups exists, and they rotate on a six-months period so that there are always two of them ready for deployment. As of today, the Battlegroups are what gets closer to a EU Army, but they are essentially rapid intervention forces meant for crisis management operations and they are clearly not sufficient for protecting Europe from an external invasion in the optic of collective self-defence; a task that by now only be carried out by NATO.
Over the decades, the EU has slowly increased the capabilities and the scope of its military means, but its foreign policy tools remain largely civilian and it is still very far away from having its own armed forces. As a matter of fact, there are various challenges along this path.
The first are political and juridical: according to the norms introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty, giving the EU collective defence competences requires a decision of the European Council, which is an institution that acts by unanimity; notably for what concerns the CFSP and consequently the CSDP. Also, creating a EU Army would require a higher level of political integration and a common defence budget, which may exist in parallel with national ones or substitute them. This demands in turn to establish the rules related to drafting and approving the budget, to weapons procurement, to strategic planning and command, and others. Considering the political divergences and the different strategic needs of member states, reaching a common position on such matters is very difficult. For instance, other member states may likely oppose or at least refuse to support Macron’s EU Army project by interpreting it as a French-centric initiative aimed at expanding France’s influence and at pursuing its national interests in the EU and abroad.
Second, there are the actual military aspects. Having a single EU Army would require the coherent standardization of equipment, doctrines, practices, trainings, uniforms, denominations, and more. Again, given the different national priorities of member states, this is complicated to achieve.
Finally, there is the linguistic dimension: the number of idioms used in the EU makes creating a unified Army more complicated. This could be solved with relative ease by adopting a single “official” language for the military, but there would still be disagreements over which one to choose.
As such, it is extremely unlikely and probably impossible that a EU Army will be created anytime soon, if ever. At best, some progress may be made over expanding the number, size, capabilities and roles of the Battlegroups; which after all would already be a quite considerable achievement considering all the obstacles towards some form of collective defence. As the international context becomes more challenging, the EU member states may find the political willingness to deepen their defence cooperation, but this will surely be a long and complicated process.
The last decade has been a difficult one for the European Union. In the wake of the 2009 debt crisis, much debate has arisen around its nature, its powers, its governance and its policies.
The situation got only worse when the migrant inflow boomed in 2015, triggering a EU-level crisis.
In this strained socio-economic context, diverging views on the EU as a polity have emerged at the political level both inside the single member states and inside the organization’s institutions.
Recently, two events have revived once more the debate. The first is the re-election of Viktor Orbán, a prominent conservative and Eurosceptic politician, as Prime Minister of Hungary.
The second is the statement by France’s President Emmanuel Macron that the EU is facing a “civil war” on its fundamental values resulting from different opinions between its Western and Central-Eastern members.
This affirmation seems exaggerated, at least at a first glance. But in such a turbulent political context, it raises a legitimate question: is the EU on the edge of a civil war?
To answer this question, the first thing to do is determining in which conditions a civil war does start. Essentially, this happens when two or more socio-political groups belonging to the same political entity disagree on the existing and/or future institutional order; and, being unable or unwilling to peacefully find a compromise through the existing institutional mechanisms, opt for armed conflict to impose their view and determine who will (re)shape the existing order by the use of coercion. Usually, a civil war opposes one group fighting to preserve the standing institutional framework (along with the prerogatives it enjoys thanks to it) and another group who wants to dismantle it (and set up a new order more favourable to its interests).
That said, history is full of examples of civil wars; from those which paved the way to the end of the Roman Republic centuries ago to the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Yemen. But one is particularly significant due to its similarities with the situation the EU is facing today: the American Civil War.
The US Civil War, also known as War of Secession, was an armed conflict that split the United States between 1861 and 1865.
The contenders where two: one was the Union (the North), formed by states that remained loyal to the government of the United States;
and the other was the Confederacy (the South), made up of states which seceded from the US and form a separate political entity known as the Confederate States of America (CSA).
Usually, this war is portrayed as a fight over the issue of slavery, with the Union supporting its abolishment and the Confederacy favourable to its preservation.
But even though slavery was indeed a central issue in sparking the conflict, the situation was far more complex than a clear-cut black-vs-white clash between conservative and progressist ideals. As a matter of fact, there were also major political, juridical-institutional and economic factors linked to the debate over slavery and human rights.
To understand this, it is necessary to perform a rapid historical overview on the prelude to the conflict. After being recognized as a sovereign polity by the Paris Treaty that officially ended the War of Independence in 1783, the United States began developing and expanding to the West. Rapidly, new states were founded and admitted to the Union.
But the economic outlook of the member states started diverging: those located in the North embraced industrialization, whereas the states in the South remained essentially agricultural.
There, rich landlords owned vast plantations, and exploited a large workforce of black slaves to work them. With time, this North-South gap became more and more marked, and it ultimately assumed a political dimension as well.
As a matter of fact, the Northern states needed cheap manpower to sustain their rapid industrialization. The mass of black slaves living in the South was the ideal solution, but it was impossible to hire them since they were a private property of the Southern landowners.
Consequently, the North states started calling for slavery to be abolished, provoking the firm opposition of the Southerners who needed slaves to cultivate the plantations that were the base of their local economy.
Besides, the two sides also diverged over trade policies: the North wanted protectionist measures to shelter its developing industry, while the South supported free trade as a mean to continue exporting its agricultural products abroad.
This led to an intense constitutional debate over slavery, and ultimately over the power of the federal government to introduce and enforce legislation on the matter all over the US territory.
Again, the opinion diverged between the North and the South: essentially, the former claimed the central government had this authority, whereas the latter considered this as a violation of the constitutional limitations on the powers of the federal institutions.
So, the debate took a dimension that went beyond the issue of slavery and focused on the nature of the US as a polity. The Union favored a strong central government having large powers,while the Confederates defended the rights and prerogatives of the single member states. The combination of all these factors finally led them to secede from the US in 1861 and form an alternative polity, the Confederate States of America (CSA).
The name itself is significant, as it reveals the different way these states interpreted the Constitution and conceived America as a political entity: they wanted a Confederation, so a polity granting more powers to the member states; in contrast to a Federation where the central authorities have larger constitutional competences.
Now, there are striking similarities between the situation of the US before the Civil War and that of the EU today.
The latter has also expanded during the previous decades by admitting new member states, with the most important “enlargement wave” taking place in 2004 with Central and Eastern European countries; and the most recent new member being Croatia, which joined the organization in 2013.
Again, similarly to America at the eve of the Civil War, the EU is also facing an intense debate over human rights that has greater economic, political and “constitutional” implications (there is not a proper EU Constitution, but the general sense of the term is still applicable to the Treaties at the base of the EU). In this context, two camps are identifiable, the complexity of reality notwithstanding.
As I argued in another article, one is formed by the original (or at least more ancient) members of the EU, concentrated in Western Europe; while the other includes the more recent ones, located in the Central-Eastern part of the continent and whose core is made of the four countries forming the Visegrád Group (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia; known also as V4).
The starting point to understand the divergence between these two “factions” is the migration crisis. As a matter of fact, the former group is demanding the Central-Eastern partners to accept a larger share of migrants. But the Visegrád states oppose these requests. As in the 1850s America, the issue is not merely humanitarian, since there are economic and political reasons behind the respective positions.
Countries like Italy, Greece and others (including France and Germany to some degree) worry that the migrant flow will put their socio-economic order under stress and that it may hamper the sluggish recovery from the recent debt crisis.
In contrast, the V4 and other states oppose such policies of migrant redistribution because they may slow down their ongoing economic development. But the divergence is also a matter of past experiences. Western countries have a long tradition of immigration from abroad (often as a consequences of their colonial past) and their societies are more used to the presence of foreigners; thus explaining their softer stance on immigration. This is not the case of Central-Eastern European states, that therefore prefer stricter measures in regard to immigration.
Finally, similarly to America before the civil war, the current debate in the EU also has a prominent institutional dimension. This can be explained from a historical perspective. Countries from the Western part of the continent took their current form as a result of a centralization process, which makes them more willing to accept devolving parts of their sovereignty to a supranational entity like the EU. That is why (in spite of mounting Eurosceptic forces) they remain favorable to further European integration; especially in the case of France, that appears willing to become the driver of deeper integration through devolving more powers to supranational institutions and by crating a true fiscal union (even though this met resistance from Germany).
On the contrary, the Visegrád states and those aligned with them oppose strengthening the powers of the EU institutions and want to preserve their fundamental sovereign rights. The reason lies in their past: these countries arose after the collapse of larger multinational polities affected by severe institutional deficiencies, and also had a long history of foreign domination and meddling which ended only in 1991 with the fall of the Soviet Union. As a result, they see the EU as another cumbersome supranational entity that will put them in a subordinate position and are therefore unwilling to devolve more powers to it.
This underlying contrast over the powers of European institutions is the most important aspect in the current debate, because it will have direct repercussion over the future of the EU. Now, the problem is that, while opinions are discordant among the member states; the complex institutional mechanisms of the EU do not facilitate the search for a compromise
Introducing deep changes (both in the sense of increased integration and of more protection of the states’ sovereignty) requires a revision of the Treaties that form the bloc’s “constitution”; but this demands in turn a long and multi-stage procedure where reaching a consensus is hard and where a single “wrong” step can block the entire process (think of the French and Dutch referenda that sunk the proposed Constitutional Treaty in 2005).
Considering that the divergences are growing, finding a common agreement over the EU, its powers and its values may be impossible; and this could lead to an institutional stalemate.
And what then? Will the EU plunge into civil war as the US did in the past? Not necessarily. Modern-day European states and their societies are strongly averse to war, which is already a huge safeguard against extreme solutions.
And if it is true that European powers have been fighting themselves for centuries, it is also true that the EU was established after the trauma of WWII also as a mean to put a definitive end to that continuous bloodshed.
Moreover, in spite of its slowness and difficulties, the EU proved capable to adapt and preserve itself during the past. In more cynic terms, since the EU is not a state, even if one or more of its members decided to unilaterally “secede”, it would not have its own military means to enforce its rule and re-bring them in as the Union eventually did with the Confederates in 1865. Finally, this scenario is unlikely for the simple fact that the Treaty on the European Union (Art. 50) contains provisions allowing a member state to withdraw; as the United Kingdom decided to do after the 2016 vote on Brexit
But it is exactly a mass Brexit-like scenario what can raise concerns over the long-term tenure of the EU.
A full-scale civil war seems unlikely (unless the international situation becomes so severely deteriorated in economic and political terms to bring states to the point of using war to secure their interests); but if the existing divergences continue to mount and no solution is reached, then it is still possible that some member states (most likely the V4 ones) will decide to leave the EU.
The consequences are difficult to predict, ranging from an easier path to greater integration between the remaining like-minded members to a dissolution of the organization. In any case, the EU would be weakened at the international level, possibly leaving room for alternative blocs. All this would bring uncertainty in political and economic terms, and (especially if the EU were dismantled), it would certainly be a turning point in European History, as the Civil War was in America’s.
In recent years, France’s geopolitical environment has dramatically deteriorated. With the rise of populism in all corners of the Western world from the Brexit vote to the election of Donald Trump, the migration crisis in Europe as a result of the Arab Spring, the Libya and Syria crisis have created an atmosphere of insecurity . France has also deployed troops to Estonia as part of NATO battalions in response to an emboldened Russia.
Twelve months ago, in October 2017, the Ministry of Defense published a national security strategic review that intended to address the most immediate challenges France faces as well as clear vision of long-term geopolitical and technological trends. I’m Kasim, this is KJ Vids and in this video, we will look at France’s role in the world and the direction in which it is heading. Will France remain a GREAT POWER?
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Read original article on The Journal or read some of the key points below;
- AN ACTOR WHO was rehearsing in the toilet of a French train was quizzed by police as a possible terrorist threat after a guard overheard the words “weapon” and “gun”, transport authorities have said.
- The 35-year-old had shut himself away in a toilet to rehearse his lines for an English-language stage role.
- A passing train guard who overheard his soliloquy raised the alarm – telling his bosses there was someone talking about weaponry.
- The high-speed train, en route to Paris from Marseille, made an unscheduled stop in the city of Valence where security forces took the man for questioning at a police station.
- He was later released without charge.