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Month: December 2018

Israel’s Enigmatic relationship with India

India and Israel have been allies for much of recent history although the relations between these two countries have been low-profile and only started getting global attention in recent years. Besides having strong economic ties the two countries also share key strategic and military cooperation.

Surprisingly India-Israel relations were largely informal until 1991. Despite having some ties since the 1960s mainly owing to defence and intelligence cooperation, India did not formalise diplomatic relations due to having a pro-Arab and pro-Palestinian stance. However this gradually changed when they formally established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992.[1]

History

India recognised Israel as early as 1950, but did not establish diplomatic ties until 1992. During the Suez crisis in 1956 the then Israeli foreign minister Moshe Sharett visited India as the Israeli army pushed into Egypt after Egyptian President Gamam Abdel Nasser nationalised the canal; while India played the role of mediator alongside the UK, the US and Yugoslavia.

During the Sino-Indian war in 1962, Indian PM Jawaharlal Nehru sought arms from Israel, writing to Israeli PM Ben Gurion, and he responded, forming the foundations for defense cooperation between the two countries. This paved way for increased bilateral cooperation over the years as India sought more arms in their war with Pakistan in 1965 as well as in 1971.[2]

Throughout much of the 1970 and 1980s, India kept its distance from Israel publicly due to its support for the Palestinian cause. India was a founding member of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) that was supportive of anti-colonial struggles around the world which explains their support for the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO).[3] India was astonishingly one of the first non-Arab states to recognise Palestinian independence. There were several geopolitical issues that shaped India’s standpoint during the 1970s and 80s. The seemingly antagonist position between India and Israel also involved India’s diplomatic strategy of trying to counter Pakistan’s influence in the Arab world as well as of safeguarding its oil supplies from the Gulf.

There were other major motives behind India’s anti-Israel stance. India has a large Muslim population and their antagonism towards Israel played a major role in delaying diplomatic relations, as politicians feared that they may lose Muslim votes in key regions if they were to formalise ties.[4] Also,  was the fact that thousands of Indian citizens worked in the Gulf, helping keep its foreign exchange reserves afloat.

Security cooperation

Even before establishing formal ties, India and Israel managed to collaborate in specific areas, with India’s main intelligence agency RAW (research and analysis wing) and Israel’s Mossad having signed a secret cooperation agreement in the areas of security, intelligence and military equipment.[5] The two top intelligence agencies established relationships since the 1960s. This was remarkable because throughout the 1970s and 80s their bilateral relations were sour. The situation started to shift in 1989 as three major developments sowed the seeds of change: first, the beginning of the era of coalition politics in India; second, the beginning of Pakistan-sponsored insurgency in Kashmir; and finally, break-up of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War coupled with the fall-out from the reversal of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.[6] Since the early 1990s, the growing insurgent activities in Kashmir sponsored by Pakistan heightened regional security environment of India and the then opposition party BJP kept pressurising the government to normalise relations with Israel. After the end of the Cold War, India, like many other countries had to make major changes to their foreign policy to accommodate the changing international milieu. It went towards economic liberalisation, opening its doors to other nations and subsequently formalised diplomatic relations with Israel. It was however kept low-profile due to India’s interests in the Middle East.

India gave a number of reasons to justify the 1992 opening of formal relations, which are as follows[7]:

  1. Israel’s criticality to what happens in West Asia and the Gulf, that is a part of India’s extended neighbourhood impacting its strategic space, energy supplies and the 6 million Indians living in the region.
  2. Sophisticated defence equipment , technology and systems from Israel; potential cooperation in security and defence including counter terrorism.
  3. Absence of any quid pro quo from the Arab states
  4. Agricultural prowess including related technologies of Israel.

More recently the economic rivalry between India and China plays a role in this context. The growing relations between China and Pakistan have raised insecurities, especially the fact that Pakistan are the largest recipient of Chinese arms. These issues gave India more reasons to build-up their own arms and as Israel are among the top arms manufacturers in the world with one of the best research and development facilities as well as a supposedly good counter-terrorism unit, there are more reasons to increase cooperation in the field of security and defence.

First Israeli PM visit to India[8]

Ariel Sharon was the first Israeli PM to visit India in 2003 and the bilateral relations between the two nations started gaining publicity. State visits from officials started to take place since the establishment of diplomatic relations. This laid the framework for further cooperation in various areas; Agreements on Cooperation in the field of Health Sciences and Medicine and on Cooperation in combating illicit trafficking and abuse of narcotic drugs and psychotic substances were signed in 2003. In the same year, more significant agreements were signed in the field of protection of the environment, and another on the exemption of Visa requirements of holders of diplomatic, official and service passports.

2005 saw a MoU on India-Israeli Research and Development Fund Initiative while in 2006 a major pact was signed in the field of agriculture cooperation.

 Bilateral trade

Bilateral trade progressed rapidly since 1992. From a base of USD 200 million in 1992 comprising primarily of diamonds, merchandise trade has diversified and the overall figure stood at an astonishing USD 5.19 billion in 2011. In 2016 the figure slumped to USD 4.16 billion in 2016 (excluding defence) with the balance of trade in Israel’s favour. Trade in diamonds constitutes over 53 percent of bilateral trade. After China and Hong Kong, India is Israel’s thirds largest trading partner in Asia. Currently the sectors forming the diversified bilateral trade include pharmaceuticals, agriculture, IT and telecom, and homeland security. India’s major exports to Israel include precious stones and metals, chemical products, textiles and textile articles, while major exports from Israel include precious stones and metals, chemicals and mineral products, base metals and machinery and transport equipment.

Cooperation between the two nations increased dramatically ever since the election of India’s new Hindu nationalist BJP government led by Narendra Modi in 2014. This was followed by a first ever visit by an Israeli defence minister in 2015. The current prime ministers Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel and Modi of India met for the first time at a UN General Assembly in 2014 where they discussed economic, technological, and agricultural collaboration for the future, while Netanyahu expressed his concerns about a nuclear Iran and the spread of radical Islam throughout Middle East.[9] In 2017, Modi made a stand alone visit to Israel- the first ever by an Indian PM.

Just weeks before modi’s historic visit, Netanyahu’s cabined agreed on measures aimed at increasing Israel’s non-diamond exports to India by 25 percent while establishing a new 40 million USD joint innovation, research and development fund. In July this year Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) signed an agreement with India’s KSU in July 2018, to operate Israeli Taxibot semi-robotic vehicles at India’s New Delhi and Mumbai airports. Taxibot is connected to planes which taxi the airplanes from the airport’s jet bridge without the use of the airplane’s main engines.[10]

Israel in recent years have taken a strategic decision aimed at strengthening economic relations with China, Japan and India. Major Indian software companies including TCS, Infosys, Tech Mahindra and Wipro have began to penetrate the Israeli market. During PM Modi’s visit in July 2017, the first meeting of the newly established India-Israel CEOs Forum took place.[11]

Defence cooperation: military equipment and technology

Defence cooperation forms one of the strongest aspects of the bilateral relations

India is the largest buyer of Israeli military equipment, while Israel is India’s largest customer after Russia.[12]

Israel produces some of the most sophisticated, cutting edge weapons systems in the world and India have been major buyers for a while now. India buys weapons systems for their armed forces, including navy and air force.

Since the 1990s, India purchased UAVs, drones, airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) radar systems, anti-tank missiles and many more weapons systems in deals worth billions of dollars. In 2007, the two nations signed a 2.5 billion DSD deal to develop an anti-aircraft weapons systems in India, and in 2009[13], Israel sold Barak 8 air defence systems to India for a staggering 1.1 billion USD. In 2011 Indian army bought more than 1000 units of Israeli X-95 assault rifle to use in counterinsurgency operation. In 2011 there were reports of a deal in which India were to purchase a large number of Israeli Spike anti-tank missiles, launchers, and related equipment worth nearly a billion dollars, from Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense Systems;[14]. Although the old contract with Rafael was cancelled, India has recently been on the verge of signing a 500 million USD deal with Israel to buy 4500 Spike missiles in a government-to-government purchase which could be finalised any moment.[15]

Israel also provides India with military technologies, and strategies for count-terrorism, including offering assistance following the 2008 Mumbai attacks.[16]

 Shifting Israel-Palestine stance

In 2015, India abstained from voting against Israel at the UN human rights commission signalling a shift in its Israel-Palestine policy. However in 2017 it voted for an Arab-sponsored resolution that rejected the US recognition of Jerusalem as capital of Israel.

 Conclusion

Despite a recent setback taking place due to India having voted against the US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the bilateral relations between the two nations have been growing stronger since the arrival of Modi making way for a new era of collaboration. In early 2018, Saudi Arabia opened its airspace for the first time ever to a commercial flight to Israel with the inauguration of an Air India route between New Delhi and Jerusalem.[17]

It seems today that the history of advocacy for the Palestinian cause is gradually diminishing as India is growing in alliance with Israel in more areas of cooperation and assistance. While India racks up more arms deals and equips its military with more sophisticated weapons systems and technology, it will be interesting to see further developments especially in the field of defence and security cooperation and find out what their main objectives are.

 [1] http://www.atimes.com/india-israel-relations-obscurity-certainty/

[2] https://www.livemint.com/Politics/k4CBHr4bIzoZ0O6OBOXw1M/India-Israel-ties-A-timeline.html ; https://www.tau.ac.il/humanities/abraham/india-israel.pdf

[3] http://www.rubincenter.org/meria/2004/12/pant.pdf

[4] Aafreedi, Navras (2012). “The Impact of Domestic Politics on India’s Attitudes towards Israel and Jews”. In Singh, Priya; Susmita, Bhattacharya. Perspectives on West Asia: The Evolving Geopolitical Discourses. Shipra Publications. pp. 171–183. ISBN 9788175416376.

[5] Pant, Harsh V. 2004a. ‘India–Israel Partnership: Convergence and Constraints’, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), vol. 8, no. 4

[6] https://www.tau.ac.il/humanities/abraham/india-israel.pdf

[7] https://www.tau.ac.il/humanities/abraham/india-israel.pdf

[8] https://www.tau.ac.il/humanities/abraham/india-israel.pdf

[9] https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/history-and-overview-of-india-israel-relations

[10] https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/history-and-overview-of-india-israel-relations

[11] https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Unclassified_Bilateral_briefb.pdf

[12] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-airshow-india-israel/israeli-defense-minister-lands-at-india-airshow-to-boost-arms-sales-idUSKBN0LM0WL20150218

[13] “IAI signs $2.5 billion deal with India – Israel Business, Ynetnews”. Ynetnews.com.

[14] https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-1000633160 ; https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/world/india-to-buy-israelis-spike-missile-for-1-b/article9749112.ece

[15] https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-set-to-seal-500mn-deal-with-israel-to-buy-4-500-spike-missiles/story-wdT2IufrQ4ldybZFX76X5K.html

[16] Horovitz, David; Matthew Wagner (27 November 2008). “10 hostages reportedly freed from Mumbai Chabad House”. The Jerusalem Post.

[17] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-israel-airspace-riyadh-tel-aviv-flight-air-india-iran-flight-times-airlines-a8269891.html

The Mughal Empire – Rise of Muslims Episode 5

Babur was twelve years old when he became king. He was descended from Tamerlane on his father’s side and from Genghis Khan on his mother’s. Immediately he had to fight for survival. Babur dreamt of glory; he would take Samarkand, the seat of his great ancestor Timur.

In 1497 at the age of fifteen Babur marched on Samarkand and seized the city. But then he was ousted, to discover that meanwhile he had lost his own beloved home at Fergana. His whole world had collapsed; he was now no king at all.

He had lost Samarkand and was driven into exile, admitting, ‘I was reduced to a sore state and wept much.’ Harassed by rebellion, opposed by his army, without a home and reduced to a low point in his fortunes, he would fight back, ‘One or two reverses could not make me sit down and do nothing.’

What are China’s Interests in Afghanistan?

The inexorable economic rise of China is producing political and strategic repercussions in all directions. One of the more interesting cases is China’s growing interest in Afghanistan, a country wracked by multiple conflicts and intermittently occupied by foreign powers for nearly forty years.

China and Afghanistan are immediate neighbours as they share a short 76 km border. The border point is distant from urban centres on both sides as it interfaces with the extremity of the Wakhan corridor on the Afghan side, and the outer edge of the Chalachigu Valley on the Chinese side.

The immediacy of Afghanistan’s geographic proximity to China makes the country hard to ignore. But in view of Afghanistan’s profile as an essentially failed state which has been in political and military turmoil for four decades, China can hardly afford to take its eyes of the place.

Add to that the fact that global powers, notably two superpowers in the form of the former Soviet Union and the United States, have maximally intervened in Afghan affairs (notably by occupying the country), then we can legitimately wonder as to why China hasn’t also forcefully intervened in Afghan affairs. Not yet anyway.

Welcome to KJ Vids. In this video we will examine the reasons behind China’s growing involvement in Afghanistan.

What is the full extent of Chinese involvement in Afghanistan?

China is reportedly building its first military base in Afghanistan. It is important to note that the Chinese government denies these claims and only admits to building a training camp in the Wakhan corridor to train Afghan forces. According to Chinese military sources, Beijing is helping Afghanistan set up a mountain brigade in the remote north-eastern corner of the country.

But even if we take these Chinese denials at face value, the fact that China admits to training Afghan forces is in and of itself of great political and strategic import. It speaks to growing Chinese influence in Kabul and signals that China wants to get involved in the military affairs of its volatile western neighbour.

Despite its massive economic clout, and projections that it will displace America as the world’s biggest economy as early as 2032, China hasn’t invested in a big political presence overseas. It may surprise many viewers that China has only one avowed military base overseas and that’s situated in Djibouti.

The newly opened base in Djibouti is designed to serve multiple military and economic functions but above all it is going to provide China with vital experience in how to exercise and manage power projection well beyond its borders. It is perhaps China’s first step toward projecting hard power at a global level, akin to how Western powers flex their muscles on the world stage.

The training camp in the Wakhan corridor (with or without Chinese troops) is clearly not about power projection on the world stage. For a start it borders china and is in close proximity to the restive Chinese region of Xinjiang. China faces serious unrest in this region as a result of continually repressing the region’s indigenous Muslim community known as the Uyghurs. In that context, the base in the remote north-eastern corner of Afghanistan is focussed on counter-terrorism operations and to that end it is potentially more concerned with Chinese security than Afghanistan’s. More on this later.

But beyond latest reports of Sino-Afghan military cooperation, just how involved is Beijing in Afghanistan? Well, for a start China maintains a relatively large embassy in Kabul, a reflection of the scope of its operations across the country. China has an abiding economic interest in Afghanistan, primarily not because the country is attractive economically, but because Afghanistan is central to two of China’s core regional economic ambitions.

These are the Belt and Road Initiative and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. China needs a measure of stability and security in Afghanistan in order to safeguard its massive regional investments, stretching from Pakistan to Central Asia. To that end, China began to step up its activities in Afghanistan from 2014 onwards.

At the economic level, Beijing is involved in the Afghan economy in multiple ways. First, China gives Afghanistan direct financial aid. Statistics vary but according to conservative estimates Beijing has given Kabul at least $410 million in direct aid since 2014.

Second, China has emerged as Afghanistan’s biggest foreign investor, focussing mostly on minerals and other natural resource extraction. China was also the first country to begin extracting oil from the Amu Darya basin in northern Afghanistan.

But not all Chinese investment projects have progressed according to plan, in part because of lack of security but equally because of the nature of Chinese overseas economic and commercial enterprise. Concerns about contractual issues and the general aggressive and single-minded approach of Chinese firms – often to the detriment of local workers’ rights – have ground some projects to a halt. The best example is the Mes Aynak concession (concerned with copper ore extraction) which was awarded to Chinese firms more than ten years ago but which has so far failed to even get off the ground.

At the political level, China stepped up its involvement in Afghanistan in late 2014 by trying to set up a “forum” to revive peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. This was followed by other initiatives, notably in partnership with Pakistan. But China’s attempt at peace-making has been largely unsuccessful, reflecting two inescapable facts. Foremost, China lacks experience in foreign conflict resolution. Second, as an ally of Pakistan, China is not seen as an honest broker by the Afghan government.

But to fully understand the drivers of China’s involvement in Afghanistan and Beijing’s desired outcomes we must take account of geopolitics and specifically China’s competition with major global and regional powers in this arena. Let’s start with India.

Undermining India in Afghanistan

Despite its substantial investments in Afghanistan – and notwithstanding its role as a major donor to the Afghan government – it is important to note that China is not in the first tier of active states in the Afghan arena. That distinction goes to three countries, namely the United States, Pakistan and Iran.

China belongs to a second-tier group of countries that are vying for influence in Afghanistan. The other member states of this tier are India and Russia. Similar to China, the Indians have also stepped up their activities in Afghanistan, although not in the sharp manner as Beijing post-2014. By contrast, New Delhi has incrementally increased its activities in Afghanistan since the overthrow of the Taliban in late 2001.

India has to tread carefully in Afghanistan so as not to draw Pakistan’s wrath. The latter remains the single most influential player in Afghanistan and in view of broader Indo-Pakistan hostilities, any significant movement by New Delhi inside Afghanistan is likely to draw a fierce reaction from Islamabad.

The Indian embassy in Kabul was bombed twice, in 2008 and 2009 respectively, causing dozens of fatalities. The 2008 attack – which killed 58 people including an Indian brigadier general – was attributed to Pakistan’s notorious Inter-Services Intelligence agency by US intelligence officials.

Unlike Pakistan, China is not interested in taking “kinetic” action against Indian interests in Afghanistan. In fact, the two powers are known to cooprate on joint projects in Afghanistan, notably developing the new Afghan diplomatic corps.

Limited cooperation notwithstanding, China is clearly interested at containing Indian influence in Afghanistan as any increase of influence there positively impacts India’s standing in the broader Central Asia region. India is fast making inroads in Central Asia – and although it cannot displace the two biggest actors in that arena, namely China and Turkey – nevertheless Beijing is fearful of the potential political impact of New Delhi’s outreach to Central Asian states.

Keeping America in check

As we have seen in relation to India, the strategic impact of China’s involvement in Afghanistan primarily serves to augment the role and standing of a Chinese ally, notably Pakistan.

The same pattern can be observed in relation to China’s view of and approach towards the US presence in Afghanistan. In hard power terms – specifically in terms of the deployment of military forces and centrality to the counter-insurgency campaign against the Taliban and its allies – the US is the dominant foreign power in Afghanistan.

But a more nuanced appraisal of power and influence projection in Afghanistan cannot fail but to identify Pakistan and Iran as the true dominant foreign powers not least because they are Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours and will continue to compete for dominance long after the US has departed the arena.

In view of its broader rivalry with the US, notably in the South China Sea, the People’s Republic does not the want the US to succeed in any conflict arena, let alone not one with massive geopolitical importance, as demonstrated by the longstanding and multi-faceted Afghan conflict.

To that end, China’s strategic posture in Afghanistan complements the role and standing of another one of its allies, notably the Islamic Republic of Iran. But whilst Iran takes active measures against US and broader Western interests in Afghanistan – by for instance allegedly directly supporting the Taliban in military operations – China is content to limit its containment strategy to the political and diplomatic levels.

The domestic dimension

Finally, in assessing China’s role and influence in Afghanistan, it is important to take full stock of the domestic considerations informing Chinese strategy. As stated earlier, China has a counter-terrorism stake in the conflict as it fears infiltration by Uyghur and other militants from Afghanistan into China’s restive Xinjiang region.

Furthermore, the Islamic State group is active in Afghanistan and by definition this jihadist group is deeply opposed to the Chinese presence that country. More broadly, the Islamic State (or Daesh as its detractors call it) is incensed by China’s massive repression of Uyghurs and other Chinese Muslims, specifically in Xinjiang but also across China as a whole. China fears that the Islamic State group may try to conduct operations inside China and the Wakhan corridor would be the preferred infiltration point. This explains China’s military interest in the corridor.

But beyond jihadist groups, all the authentic Islamic currents in Afghanistan are appalled by China’s treatment of the Uyghurs. The Chinese have reportedly imprisoned up to one million Uyghur Muslims in so-called “counter-extremism centres” which amount to concentration camps.

If China wants to be successful in Afghanistan, and ultimately to play a stabilising role by reconciling the Afghan government with its opponents, then it must also properly address concerns about its treatment of Chinese Muslim minorities.             

 

Is Saudi pivoting towards Russia?

At a first glance, Saudi Arabia and Russia have not much in common in terms of foreign policy: the former is one of America’s closest allies, whereas the latter is its main geostrategic competitor along with China. But in the complex geopolitics of the Middle East, their bilateral relations are more multifaceted than it may seem; and recent events may drive them closer.

The rise of Instagram and Influencer Marketing

Instagram (also known as IG) is a social networking application made for sharing photos and videos with the help of mobile devices running the iOS or Android (or Windows Phone) platforms. Created by Kevin Systrom and Mike Krieger and launched in October 2010 and was exclusively available to iOS and an Android version was released 6 months later.

IG created a lot of hype since its early days mainly due to the different types of filters to use in photos and making it available for users to edit photos using the filters in-app right before uploading their contents. IG was able to gather a million users in its first two months, and 10 million by the end of its first year of operation.
While many companies are engaged in direct marketing through their official IG accounts, Influencer marketing has recently become one of the latest and prominent marketing phenomenon- it refers to the promotion of brands and products online, and IG was one of the first social media networks to develop links between brands and influencers.

A key strength was perhaps the added backing by Facebook besides its inherent value of the highly visual posts. Influencer marketing is the notion of brands reaching their target audience through an online influencer- mostly celebrities and successful people with many followers; and pass on to their followers the message they intend to spread. It is true that some brands are considered quite influential themselves, but many firms found working with successful influencers with a large fanbase a great opportunity and an effective tactic to market their products.

Did Islam destroy the Mongols? – Rise of Muslims Episode 4

Based entirely on the book by Ali Mahmood titled “Muslims” – Purchase using this link – https://www.kjvids.co.uk/product/muslims/

In the fourth episode of this videos series on the book titled “Muslims” by Ali Mahmood, the author talks about the Mongol Empire, Timur and the The Delhi Sultanate

In the twelfth century the two great empires of the time were the Muslims in the Middle East and the Chinese in the Far East. Between these two great empires lay a vast land, by-passed by history, whose inhabitants were the nomad Mongols who lived as they had always lived on horseback, in tribes without cities, without houses, without books.

It was here that Temujin was born who would later be known as Genghis Khan, the World Conqueror. His father died and he was raised by his mother. Survival was not easy, and adversity turned the helpless and illiterate child into a warrior who created the greatest empire in history, a lawmaker whose Yasa gave his people a code that endured long after his death, and a leader whose wisdom and discipline inspired and transformed his followers. He imposed a system based on merit.

Young Temujin was captured and locked into a big wooden collar called a kang. He escaped but knowing it was futile to flee with no horse, no food and a kang around his neck, he appealed to the family that had been his recent jailor who hid him. Temujin had a magical ability to persuade and seduce. He was saved and many years later he rewarded his saviours with the privileges of not paying taxes and sharing the emperor’s cup. All those who helped Genghis were rewarded, all who resisted him were destroyed.

The most important of the early followers of Genghis were two brothers, Jelme who once saved his life by sucking out the poison from an arrow that wounded the neck of the Khan, and Subotai who went on to become the greatest general in history. Subotai conquered thirty-two nations and won sixty-five pitched battles.

His achievements surpassed Alexander as he conquered Korea, China, Persia, Hungary and Russia. Europe was only saved by the death of Genghis Khan which required all Mongols to return to Mongolia to elect his successor. Subotai was a master of deception and surprise and possessed the soul of a gambler, which Napoleon considered the most important trait of a great general.

The rise of YouTube and monetisation

Since its launch in 2005, YouTube has changed the way we watch videos and create influential content online. With an audience the size of a quarter of the world’s population, this global phenomenon has over 1.8 billion active users logging in each month to watch videos. If each individual person held an account- that would be a quarter of 7.6 billion people on the planet last year using the platform.

Last year, in an average month 8 out of 10 people aged 18-49 years-old watch YouTube. The free streaming networks popularity has stemmed from the fact that we live in a multi-platform and a multi-screen world, where we want to consume our content wherever we are rather than having to pay for T.V which is only restricted to our homes.

Rather than reaching for the T.V remotes, more and more people are reaching for their phones and that is what makes YouTube so popular in the digital era. The fact that it is accessible anywhere and anyhow. YouTube covers over 95% of the world’s population and you can use the streaming site in 76 different languages.

From vlogs to music videos to gamer channels and branding, YouTube is the second most consumed site in the wold, behind google, and it shows no sign of slowing down.

How the Muslims lost Spain – The Rise of Muslims Episode 3

Based entirely on the book by Ali Mahmood titled “Muslims” – Purchase using this link – https://www.kjvids.co.uk/product/muslims/

Welcome to Episode 3 of our Rise of Muslims Documentary based on a book called Muslims by Ali Mahmood.

In the first episode Ali talked about how the Prophet Muhammed led the Muslims to the conquest of Makkah and the reigns of the first four caliphs. In the second episode, Ali discussed the rise and fall of the Umayyad dynasty and the Abbasid dynasty. In this episode Ali discusses the rise and fall of Islamic Spain and Egypt.

At the start of the 8th century Roderick, the Visigoth king ruled Spain. His able general, Count Julian protected the kingdom, keeping the Muslims of North Africa at bay. When Julian left for Africa, he left his beautiful daughter, Florinda, under the protection of the king. Roderick was fired when he saw Florinda. He raped her, and she became pregnant. She confessed to her father who resolved to take revenge.

In Africa Julian met Tarik bin Ziyad and offered to take the Muslim troops into Spain. Tarik crossed over from Africa to Spain with an exploratory force of 7000 men, stopping midway at a rock which was named after him – the Rock of Tarik, Jebel Tarik (Gibraltar).
Having crossed, Tarik burned his boats to show his men that there was no going back, it was victory or death. The small Muslim army won complete and total victory over the much larger Spanish force, Spain was conquered and remained under Muslim rule for almost eight centuries.

Musa, the Umayyad governor of North Africa was green with envy when he heard of Tarik’s astounding victories. He rushed to Spain to share in the glory and the booty. He also struck Tarik and for a while had him arrested.

The Muslims spread over the fertile south and named their land Al-Andalus. Andalusia was a land of rivers and valleys, perfect for cultivation, to which the Arabs applied their techniques of agriculture and irrigation. These farms laid the foundation for the wealth of Andalusia. The Muslims governed mildly, justly and wisely. Low taxes and a high level of religious freedom kept the people content. It was a happy time.

The role of ports in the global economy

Ports are maritime commercial facilities usually located on a coast or shore that contains one or more harbours where ships can dock and transfer cargo as well as people. Ports constitute a major component of the global transportation sector and are linked to the expanding world economy. In other words, ports are a means of integration into the global economic system.

As the WTO-agreements since the 1980s lifted several pre-existing international trade barriers, manufacturers all over the world vertically disintegrated their production systems into geographically dispersed and flexibly organised supply chain systems . The international trade regime began allowing manufacturers to relocate their production and assembly plants to more cost-efficient locations in developing economies.

Ports have been at the hearts of commerce for centuries and they only kept gaining more significance . Before the invention of aeroplanes, sea had been the main mode of transport for settlers, travellers and migrants for centuries. They played important roles in the industrial revolutions and act as a catalyst to industrialisation. While early ports were mostly used as harbours, today they are more often referred to multi-modal distribution hubs having transport links using sea, river, canal, road, rail and air routes.

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Always strive for better work. Never stop learning. Have fun a clear plan for a new project or just an idea on a napkin? Sky, land, and sea disappear together out of the world…

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